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 This thesis aims to understand what motivates energy policies of Turkey with 
respect to three main actors in the world system, the USA, the EU and Russia in the 
light of two international relations theories; neorealism and neoliberalism. After 
giving detailed energy profile of Turkey, in the thesis, neorealism is utilized or 
energy relations between Turkey and the US, whereas neoliberalism is used to 
analyze energy relations of Turkey with the EU and Russia. The study reaches to a 
conclusion that energy politics compose a significant share for relations between 
states and in this context according neorealism the result would come up as little 
cooperation and according to neoliberalism, as middle cooperation considering gains 
and interests of the actors. 
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Bu tez, dünya sistemindeki üç ana aktör; ABD, AB ve Rusya açısından 
Türkiye'nin enerji politikalarını iki uluslararası ilişkiler teorisi ışığında; yeni –
gerçekçilik ve yeni – liberalizm, incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır.  Türkiye'nin detaylı 
enerji görünüşünü verildikten sonra, tezde, yeni – gerçekçilik Türkiye ve ABD 
arasındaki enerji ilişkileri; yeni – liberalizm ise Türkiye’nin AB ve Rusya ile olan 
enerji ilişkileri analiz etmek için kullanılmaktadır. Çalışma, enerji politikalarının 
devletlerarası ilişkilerin büyük bir yüzdesini oluşturduğu ve aktörlerin edinim ve 
çıkarlarını göz önüne alarak bu bağlamda yeni – gerçekçiliğe göre sonucun az 
işbirliği ve yeni – liberalizme göre orta işbirliği olacağı sonucuna ulaşır. 
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I would like to extend my deepest appreciation to my supervisor Assistant 
Professor Ali Tekin for his remarkable contributions and guidance. His professional 
academic knowledge, his constant faith and full support always encouraged me to 
study and try harder and eventually to come up with this thesis. 
 I am thankful to Assistant Professor Paul Andrew Williams and Assistant 
Professor H. Tolga Bölükbaşı for their full support which enabled me to complete 
my thesis and for honoring me with their participation in the committee for my thesis 
defense. 
 I would also like to present my sincere gratitude to Mr. Ahmet Necdet Pamir 
who always assisted me from the beginning till the end. His significant remarks and 
comments on energy politics and recent developments in the sector enriched my 
thesis. 
 I would also like to thank all of my friends who were very eager to motivate 
me to write this thesis and formed a friendly environment during my thesis work. I 
owe special thanks to Ms. Çiğdem Akın and Dr. Şebnem Udum for their support. 
Last but not least I am so much grateful to my family; my father, my mother, 
my sister, my brother, their spouses, my niece, Derin and my nephew, Ozan. Their 
endless and genuine support enhanced my self confidence. I know their guidance will 
always open me new horizons in my life in the future. Thus I dedicate this thesis to 













TABLE OF CONTENTS....................................................................................…..vi 
LIST OF TABLES.............................................................................................…....ix 
LIST OF FIGURES............................................................................................…....x 
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION AND THEORIES..........................................…1 
1.1 Introduction..........................................................................................…………..1 




       1.4 Plan of the Book…………………………………………………………….16 
CHAPTER II: TURKEY’S ENERGY PROFILE.............................................…19 
2.1 Turkey’s Energy Profile…………………………………………………..19 
2.1.1 Petroleum................................................................................……23 
2.1.2 Natural Gas.............................................................................……25 
2.1.3 Nuclear Energy…………………………………………………...27 




2.2 Energy Routes in Turkey………………………………………………….31 
2.2.1 Iraq – Turkey Crude Oil Pipeline (Kirkuk – Ceyhan Pipeline)…..32 
2.2.2 Baku – Tbilisi – Ceyhan (BTC) Crude Oil Pipeline……………...33 
2.2.3 Samsun – Ceyhan Crude Oil Pipeline Project……………………34 
2.2.4 Baku – Tbilisi – Erzurum Gas Pipeline…………………………..34 
2.2.5 Blue Stream Gas Pipeline………………………………………...35 
2.2.6 Turkey – Greece – Italy Interconnector…………………………..35 
2.2.7 Trans Caspian Gas Pipeline Project………………………………36 
2.2.8 Iraq – Turkey Natural Gas Pipeline Project………………………36 
2.2.9 Nabucco Natural Gas Pipeline Project……………………………37 
2.3 Turkey’s Energy Profile and Analyses………………………………….37 
CHAPTER III: THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND TURKEY.........40 
3.1 Turkey – Caspian (Azerbaijan) – the USA Triangle….…………………44 
3.1.1 Major Important Pipelines for Cooperation in the Region……….46 
3.1.2 Turkish – Armenian Normalization Talks………………………..49 
3.2 Turkey – Iran – the USA Triangle….…………………………………...52 
3.2.1 An overview of Turkish – Iranian Relations……………………...53 
3.2.2 Turkey – Iran and the USA.………………………………………56 
3.3 Turkey – Iraq – the USA Triangle……………………………………....59 
3.3.1 Turkey and Iraq in Pre – War and Post – War Era……………….61 
3.3.2 Post – War Era and the US Influence on Oil Industry in Iran……64 
 3.4 Strategic Partnership for Energy?.............................................................70 
CHAPTER IV: THE EUROPEAN UNION AND TURKEY...............................76 




4.1.2 Oil and Gas……………………………………………………….85 
4.1.3 Renewable Energy………………………………………………..86 
4.1.4 Nuclear Energy…………………………………………………...88 
4.2 Turkey’s Role as an Energy Hub and its EU Accession Process…………90 
4.2.1 Impacts of Turkey’ role in energy security of the EU on its 
         accession process………………………………...…………….…98 
 4.3 How important is Turkey to the EU?......................................................103 
CHAPTER V: THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND TURKEY ….................108 
5.1 Turkey – Russia Energy Relations………………………........................109 
5.2 Russia as Nuclear Energy Expert and Gas Storage Expert?......................113 
5.3 Russian Involvement in Energy Routes Through Turkey…………….....115 
5.3.1 Nabucco Gas Pipeline Project with Russian Gas Involved……...116 
5.3.2 South Stream Gas Pipeline Project……………………………...118 
5.3.3 Samsun – Ceyhan Crude Oil Pipeline Project…………………..121 
5.4 Dependence or Interdependence?.............................................................122 



























Table I: Evolution of Energy Supply, Demand, Export and Import in Turkey…. 23 
Table II: Amounts of Imported Natural Gas According to Counties……………. 26 
Table III: Electricity Generation According to Sources………………………… 31 
Table IV: Turkey’s Major Exported Goods and Commodities to the US………. 41 
Table V: Foreign Trade of Turkey with Iran……………………………………. 54 
Table VI: Major Recipients of Russian Natural Gas Exports 2006 – 2007……... 110 
Table VII: Primary Goods Imported from Russia………………………………. 111 
Table VIII: Trade between Turkey and Russia………………………………….. 112 
























Figure I: Sectors in Energy Consumption in Turkey……………………………. 20 
Figure II: Evolution of Domestic Energy Supply Demand in Turkey…………... 21 
Figure III: Ratio of Dependence of Turkey on External Energy Resources…….. 22 
Figure IV: Domestic Crude Oil Production……………………………………... 24 
Figure V: Overseas Crude Oil Production………………………………………. 24 
Figure VI: Shares of Supply of Primary Energy Resources in Turkey (2008)….. 29 
Figure VII: Electricity Demand…………………………………………………. 30 
Figure VIII: Major Countries Iran Exports to…………………………………… 53 
















Energy issues constitute a considerable importance for strategies of states. 
Ease of access to and safe transportation of energy resources, cheap and cost-
efficient energy, reduction of dependency on any source of energy imported from 
foreign states are fundamentals of well-functioning, developed and modern 
economies. Thus energy become a very important component of strategies in 
development plans of states, and since none of the states are hundred percent 
independent of imported energy, energy issues are essential elements of foreign 
policies of states.
The main aim of this thesis is to shed light energy policies of Turkey with 
respect to affairs between Turkey and its major allies; the United States of America 
(US), the European Union (EU) and the Russian Federation mainly in the last 
decade. Regarding energy issues, relations between the US and Turkey is discussed, 
2starting with circumstances in the Caspian region after dissolution of the Soviet 
Union; following this part, influence of the US on energy relations of Turkey with 
Iran and Iraq in the last decade is touched upon. With regards to the EU, energy 
relations between Turkey and the EU are explained taking declaration of candidacy 
of Turkey to the EU as origin of the period of time of the study. In the meantime, 
Turkish – Russian energy relations are argued taking the last decade, in which dense 
relations in energy relations are observed, into consideration.  One of the essential 
questions this thesis asks is what motivates energy policies. How Turkish foreign 
policy and Turkish energy policy affect each other and how integrated they are, are 
amongst the other questions to be answered, when Turkey’s position in the world 
affairs are considered. In this context, detailed explanations and analysis of Turkish 
energy policy with remarks of Turkish foreign policy is revealed. This is also 
important to give a clear understanding of what tools are used in energy policies, 
what the gains are; to turn expectations about these policies into reliable outcomes. 
The research question this thesis is built upon is how energy relations affect 
state’s interests. In order to build the arguments of the thesis on firm ground, 
theoretical explanations are also used in the thesis, since theories of international 
relations enable research to be supported by clear definitions of the actors in the 
system, relations between these actors and motivation yielding these relations. The 
theories used in the thesis are chosen according to the explanatory power of the 
theories on interests and through which theory Turkey increases its gains most. In 
this sense, this thesis uses two theories; neorealism and neoliberalism. These two 
variants of two grand theories; realism and liberalism, are the best theories to analyze 
the specific questions this thesis asks.
3Since referring to energy profile of Turkey enables the thesis to have fruitful 
analysis of energy relations between Turkey and the three actors; the US, the EU and 
Russia, compendious introduction about energy sector of Turkey is useful to reach 
better understanding. Energy policies of Turkey, as a state having an emerging and 
rapidly growing economy, are shaped according to energy supply and demand. 
“Turkey has been experiencing rapid demand growth in all segments of the energy 
sector for decades” (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2009a: 9). 
According to statistics on sectorial energy consumption of the Republic of Turkey 
Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources (2008:b), Turkey’s overall domestic 
energy demand increased by approximately 20 percent in 36 years (1970 – 2006). 
“Recent forecasts indicate that the growth trend of 6-8 percent per year will prevail 
in the energy sector in the following years. The primary energy consumption, which 
reached around 92 million tons of oil equivalent (toe) in 2006 will rise to 126 million 
toe in (by the end of) 2010 and 222 million toe in 2020” (Republic of Turkey 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2009a: 9). 
This brief explanation about Turkey’s energy outlook (basically argues that 
Turkey has an increasing energy demand) – which will be discussed in a detailed 
way in the following chapter – yields the floor for a better preliminary analysis about 
Turkey’s energy policies with the USA, the EU and Russia.
1.2. Case Studies
This section compendiously analyzes energy relations of Turkey with the US, 
the EU and Russia in terms of level, scope and context of the interactions. In this 
4sense, the energy relations between Turkey and the US are first touched upon and 
then, energy relations between Turkey and the EU – which is followed by Turkish –
Russian energy relations.
Although the USA and Turkey are strategic partners in a very large range of 
issues in international relations, such as combating terrorism, security and non –
proliferation, these two countries do not have direct energy relations, conversely 
relations regarding energy issues rely on joint projects and cooperation.
Regarding Caspian, the American – Turkish relations have always been in 
parallel. Cooperation and coordination in the region are the basic components for 
good relations between Turkey and the US. The evident examples of cooperation 
with regards to this region would be support of the USA to Turkey for enabling 
Turkey to become an energy hub and favoring international projects in this respect, 
such as the Nabucco Natural Gas Pipeline Project, and previously the Baku – Tbilisi 
– Ceyhan Crude Oil Pipeline. However, the recent Armenian – Turkish 
normalization talks, supported by the US, have negatively affected Turkish energy 
politics in this region. These normalization talks constitute a significant importance 
especially for the US since Armenia has started to become a second alternative route 
for safety and security of energy transportation in the Caspian when risks, occurred 
because of Russian – Georgian conflict are considered. The major adverse effect has 
been observed in Azerbaijani- Turkish energy relations. Azerbaijani side claims that 
this rapprochement favored by the US without any settlement of the Nagorno –
Karabakh conflict contradicts with Azerbaijani interests. Following these debates, 
Turkey faced actions from Azerbaijani side in retaliation.
When Turkish – Iranian relations are considered, the scope of Turkish –
5American relations get a new dimension.  Basically the aim of Turkey to diversify 
dependency on imported sources of energy by including Iran, the second largest 
supplier of natural gas to Turkey (Stern, 2003: 3), yields development of Turkish –
Iranian relation with regards to energy. However, concerning the contemporary 
international situation between Iran and the US, international support in favor of 
investments made in Iran is unlikely to be forthcoming. According to the US policy –
makers, increasing relations between Iran and Turkey is not considered as only 
energy cooperation; yet as a rapprochement. The US strictly opposes all kinds of 
cooperation between Iran and Turkey (Radikal, July 2007), and, in this sense, limits 
benefits Turkey could gain from increased cooperation with Iran.
It should also be touched upon Iraq, when Turkish – American energy 
relations are analyzed. After the 2003 US invasion of Iraq, due to pursuit of a new 
but unsettled regime, security and balance in Iraq, circumstances in the country 
altered. Turkey and the US started to cooperate for promoting stability and peace in 
Iraq, and thus the Middle East. However, in the concept of energy issues, the same 
picture has not been envisaged. In the following years after the invasion, Turkey 
faced cuts and decrease in the flow in pipelines. Besides, problems in Iraqi petroleum 
law and its side effects have a role as an ignition key causing problems in the energy 
politics and states’ interests. Benefits Turkey would gain have been limited due to 
the national interests of the US and Turkey’s role in energy is highly influenced by 
the US.
Energy relations between Turkey and the EU have a scope of mainly the 
geostrategic location of Turkey. Proximity to resource rich regions of the world is the
other main factor forming principles of Turkish energy policy, giving shifts to the 
6Turkish foreign policy and affecting interactions with the EU. Turkey becomes an 
important intermediate country between resource rich regions of the world and 
resource poor states, since its geographical position lies in the intersection point of 
resource rich regions such as the Caucuses and the Middle East. Turkey, due to its 
geopolitical position and proximity to major world energy exporter countries, aims to 
become the most feasible and desired route of the EU for energy transit not only 
from Russia; but from all other sources of gas and oil. For Turkey, in this sense, 
building the legal configuration in parallel with the EU acquis communautaire1
becomes very important. Adaptations and implementations of new legislations in 
electricity, oil, gas, renewable and nuclear energy in Turkey, in parallel with the 
acquis constitute considerable importance, besides, pipelines passing through Turkey 
which strengthen Turkey’s position to turn into an energy hub. Besides becoming an 
energy hub, in the integration process in order to become a member of the EU, 
Turkey’s energy profile becomes more compatible with the EU criteria. Oil, gas, 
electricity, renewable and nuclear energy sectors face essential changes according to 
adjustments done in the context of EU accession process. Additionally, over -
dependency of the EU2 on proximal resource rich regions and its willingness to 
decrease its dependency on Russia enable Turkey, the contiguous ally, to become a 
very important actor in energy politics. However, as the duration of accession 
process extends, the Turkish foreign policy might shift its foci from the pro – EU to 
pro – Russian and cooperation between the EU and Turkey regarding energy might 
not be as strong as observed today.
In the meantime, when energy relations between Turkey and Russia are 
                    
1 Acquis communautaire will be referred as acquis in the rest of the thesis.
2 In the European continent, member countries of the EU compose 17.9 percent of the total world oil 
consumption, 16.2 percent of the total world gas consumption (and 9.1 percent of the total world coal 
consumption) (BP, June 2009; 11, 27, 35).
7analyzed, increasing cooperation in the energy sector draws attention. Due to high 
need of energy and scarcity in Turkey of energy resources, oil and gas are the major 
commodities Turkey imports from the Russian Federation which is the leading one 
among states Turkey imports oil and gas from. Major export commodities of Russia
– which is in the second rank in oil producing countries and is the leading country in 
gas producing countries – are petroleum and natural gas. Turkey is listed as the 
fourth country importing oil and gas in large amounts from Russia with percentage of 
5.9 in Russian oil and gas exports3. When trade balance and commodity trade 
between Turkey and Russia are examined, it will be obvious that oil and gas4 are the 
largest percentages among other commodities and goods traded between these 
countries. The Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, former Chief Advisor to the 
Prime Minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, in one of his speeches noted that “Turkey is 
almost 75-80 percent dependent on Russia [for energy]”5. These make it obvious that 
Turkey becomes over - dependent on Russia for energy imported. Thus increasing 
cooperation in energy is not surprising.
Turkish – Russian energy relations are not only composed of trade of major 
energy sources; but of many significant fields in energy sector. Turkey, due to its 
increasing energy consumption – especially in electricity in addition to an aim of
reducing its over dependency on imported oil and gas, has been evaluating its nuclear 
option for cost-efficient resources. In order to construct a well-developed nuclear 
                    
3 The Netherlands with a share of 12.2 percent in Russian oil and gas exports is the leading export –
partner of Russia; meanwhile Italy (9 percent), Germany (6.9 percent), Ukraine (5 percent), China (4.5 
percent), Poland (4.3 percent) are amongst the other main trading partners which mostly import oil 
and gas from Russia (CIA, 2010).
4 According to Turkish general energy balance of 2008 (Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, 
2008c), petroleum and natural gas are the mostly used energy sources both in heating and 
manufacturing among other fossil fuels.
5 Although this percentage does not rely on reliable data, the quotation is written to give a clear 
understanding of Turkey’s dependency in energy issues.
8energy plant with minimum risk and maximum efficiency, on January 13, 2010, 
Turkey signed a joint statement with Russia6. In addition to joint actions in nuclear 
power technology, Russia is involved in Turkish projects to construct and develop 
natural gas storage plants and to improve natural gas distribution networks. Russia 
again steps in the scene and becomes a partner of the Turkey’s energy policy as its is 
observed in the oil and gas trade between each other.
In the light of the reality that Russia has the leading oil and gas reserves 
within its territories, it becomes evident that Russia maintains its importance as a 
supplier in energy projects. In this context, the Nabucco Natural Gas Pipeline 
Project, South Stream Natural Gas Pipeline Project and Samsun – Ceyhan Crude Oil 
Pipeline Project become the major issues to be analyzed in for a better understanding 
of Russian involvement in international energy pipeline projects and its effects.
1.3. Theories
This section of the chapter I analyzes two theories; neorealism and 
neoliberalism in order give a broader analysis of relations of Turkey with its allies 
and neighbors in energy issues in the following chapters. 
As relied on hypotheses and assumptions of neorealism and neoliberalism, 
which are mentioned the following sections below; interactions of Turkey between 
three countries regarding energy are discussed. Neorealism has been chosen in order 
to explain energy relations between Turkey and the USA, since explanatory power of 
the neorealist approach is more appropriate to discuss influence of the USA on 
                    
6 Russia has 31 operating nuclear plants and 8 nuclear reactors constructed in 2008 (International 
Atomic Energy Agency, 2009: 12; Global Times, 2010).
9Turkey’s energy policies; because when the period of time of the study is considered, 
instead of deep economic cooperation – which neoliberalism assumes – influence of 
the USA and pursuit of way to maximize the interests are observed. As for the EU –
Turkey relations, one of the main reasons of analysis through neoliberalist approach 
is its approach towards actors in the system. It would be wrong to classify the EU as 
only a state. The EU is not a state; yet is a supranational actor7. Besides, in the EU 
case, negotiation process and mutual interactions are significant; meanwhile not only 
one side; but both sides have gains from this process such as benefits of 
implementation of the acquis for Turkey, use of advantage of geostrategic 
importance of Turkey by the EU regarding energy. These are the other reasons for 
choice of neoliberalism for the analysis. On the other hand, during the negotiation 
process, dominance and influence of the strong – which is the EU- have been 
observed in a sense that structuring the acquis requires candidate countries to adapt is 
inconvertible and Turkey has to accept and implement it. In this sense, neorealism 
might have been better to explain the dominance and influence. However inability of 
neorealism to explain deep economic cooperation and the description of the actors 
yields this thesis to analyze EU – Turkey energy relations through neoliberalism. As 
for the Turkish – Russian energy relations, what might draw attention in the first 
glance is that in energy relations, there are not only interstate interactions; but also 
transnational relations exist. The reason of why neorealism was not chosen to 
analyze these relations was that, other than Russia’s use of gas a tool to threaten 
countries and increase its influence on Russian-gas-and-oil-dependent countries, 
there is not explanatory power of neorealism to explain increased economic 
cooperation, mutual gains and also interdependence in Turkish – Russian energy 
                    
7 It should be borne in mind that the EU does not always constitute a supranational structure; yet it can 
be seen that there are intergovernmental and transnational properties. 
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relations. 
The first part of this section explains neorealism to pose a puzzle of the 
international system with a specific focus on “relative gain” concept. Detailed 
definition and explanation of assumptions and hypothesis of neorealism yield a clear 
analysis of Turkey’s relations with its allies and also its neighbors within energy 
framework in the next chapters. Finally the second part sheds light to neoliberal 
approach. Characteristics of neoliberalism, as well as complex interdependence – as 
an approach under liberalism, clarify energy politics.
1.2.1. Neorealism
Neorealism is a variant theory of realism, one of the grand theories of 
international relations. It is a systemic theory, shedding light to effects of the 
international system and, unlike realism, ignoring human nature (Walt, 1998: 31).
According to neorealism, in an international system, interactions take place at 
the level of the units which refer to sovereign states. “How units stand in relation to 
one another, the way they are arranged or positioned, is not a property of the units. 
The arrangement of units is a property of the system” (Waltz, 1979: 162). Thus, as in 
realism, the system in neorealism is defined as anarchic system is ordered by “the 
juxtaposition of similar units, but those similar units are not identical” (Waltz, 1979: 
183). Following this argument, Waltz (1979:195) states that as a unit fostering its 
own size relative to other units, it generally identifies its own interest with the 
interest of the system. Since rationality is one of most important assumptions of
11
neorealism, units in a self - help system8 are aware of external circumstances, and 
decide accordingly to find a better way for their survival. Mearsheimer (2001: 217) 
refers to ‘survival’ as a prerequisite for these units and maintaining their positions in 
the system – status quo – is the other main goal of the units. Since survival is the 
primary objective of units, it becomes a driving force for maximization of their 
interests. Basically, states that maximize their interests, thus their relative power, are 
very much concerned with the distribution of capabilities.
Distribution of capabilities between these units in a system is not fixed. “A 
state worries about a division of possible gains that may favor others more than itself. 
That is the first way in which the structure of international politics limits the 
cooperation of states” (Waltz, 1979: 178). In addition to this, since states cannot be 
certain and have imperfect information about other states’ intentions, cooperation 
becomes uneasy to achieve.
Scholars of neorealist approach define 3 types of systems, according to 
changes in the distribution of capabilities, regarding the number of great powers in 
the system. The unipolar system involves one great power along with middle and 
small powers; conversely the bipolar system is composed of two great powers with 
middle and small powers. The multipolar system contains more than two great 
powers.
There are 3 hypotheses of neorealism. The first hypothesis is about response 
to threats. Basically, if a state is threatened, it becomes more likely to balance against 
the threat. The concept of threat is the major difference from realism. Unlike in 
                    
8 Waltz (1979, 185) defines self – help system as “a system in which those who do not help 
themselves, or who do so less effectively  than others, will fail to prosper, will lay themselves open to 
dangers, will suffer.”
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realism, in neorealism, balance of power alters into a new concept of perception of 
threat. According to this view, one of reasons of threat is proximity and/or 
contiguity. 
The other two hypotheses of neorealist approach are about polarity. If the 
anarchical system is bipolar, possibility of conflict is less like to occur. “Bipolarity is 
the power configuration that produces the least amount of fear among great powers” 
compared to multipolar system (Mearsheimer, 2001: 224).
Following these definitions of assumptions and hypotheses of neorealism, in 
the following chapters, this theory is used to explain relations of Turkey with the US 
with respect to energy policies by illuminating tools used to pursue energy policies 
though the motivating factors. Diplomatic pressure and economic isolation from the 
world markets though sanctions - although neorealists do not value economic 
interests as neoliberals do - are main types of tools this thesis focuses on with respect 
energy policies. According neorealism, it can be stated that one of major elements 
motivating energy policy is geostrategic advantage of Turkey. Basically neorealism 
would be one of the best theories to interpret the function of interests (with respect to 
material relative gains) in energy policies. Rationality assumption of neorealism 
brings up reasons of interests of the USA within energy framework and actions taken 
accordingly. Besides, as a great power, reasons of maximization of relative material 
capabilities and of the competition between rivals in the system are analyzed.
1.2.2. Neoliberalism
Neoliberalism is the other theory which is shedding light to the foci of this 
13
research. Neoliberals reject centrality of states and claim that key actors of the world 
politics are specialized international organizations, multinational corporations, 
transnational and transgovernmental coalitions (Grieco, 1988: 489).
One of the other assumptions of this school of thought is anarchy, which, in 
neoliberalism, is not overemphasized; conversely interdependence was mentioned 
(Milner, 1991 in Baldwin, 1993: 167). Neoliberalism does not assume anarchy as a 
system implying lack of cooperation, unlike neorealism which assumes states to 
pertain to power and security, to have a tendency toward conflict and competition, to 
fail to cooperate (Powell, 1994: 330). Cooperation among states is achievable and its 
likelihood of occurrence is predisposed due to interdependence between states in the 
system.
Neoliberalism argues that “states seek to maximize their individual absolute 
gains and are indifferent to the gains achieved by others” (Grieco, 1988: 487). 
Basically, common interests, especially in economic affairs, motivate states to 
cooperate. “Cooperation requires the actions of separate individuals or organizations 
… to be brought into conformity with one another through a process of negotiation, 
which is often referred as ‘policy coordination’” (Keohane, 1984: 51). In order to 
prevent cheating and to maintain sound policy coordination, international institutions 
shoulder the responsibility to promote cooperation and joint action. When there are 
certain interests and certain fields where states can conduct collective policies and 
benefit jointly, it is expected that governments become much more eager to found 
institutions. “Institutions can provide information, reduce transaction costs, make 
commitments more credible, establish focal points for coordination, and in general 
facilitate the operation of reciprocity” (Keohane and Martin, 1995: 42).
14
As international institutions, regimes are also contributing factor in affairs of 
states. Ruggie (1975: 570) describes the term, regime, as “a set of mutual 
expectations, rules and regulations, plans, organizational energies and financial 
commitments, which have been accepted by a group of states.” Besides, Krasner 
(1983) defines regimes as “implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-
making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of 
international relations” (cited in Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger, 1996: 179). 
Since international regimes touch upon norms along with decision making 
procedures, these become intervening variables of interests, and outcomes of 
behaviors of states (Katzenstein, 1996: 25). Basically, international regimes enable 
states to realize their common interests in economic affairs, and induce states to give 
more importance to absolute gains. 
In addition to interest and absolute gains, intentions and flow of information 
through international regimes and institutions are also important key elements for 
neoliberals. Unlike neorealists, neoliberals do not specifically touch upon distribution 
of capabilities; yet they address intentions of states and regimes as a pattern of 
preferences of member states (Baldwin, 1993: 7 – 8). 
Under liberal approach, complex interdependence is another concept which 
highlights the importance of transnational cooperation. According to complex 
interdependence, states have numerous channels to connect societies. These channels 
are interstate relations – which are the normal channels assumed by realists; 
transgovernmental relations, which apply when states act as units; and finally 
transnational relations, which apply when states are the only units of communication 
(Keohane and Nye cited in Boli and Lechner, 2004: 78). In the absence of hierarchy 
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among state goals, these channels provide adequate policy coordination both within 
governments and across them. Communication and information enables states to 
know about preferences of each other (Milner, 1991, cited in Baldwin, 1993: 165). 
This approach stresses maximization of interests with cooperation, all kinds of 
interveners, such as international institutions, regimes, which promote joint action 
among states, are desired. Keohane and Nye indicate that “governments must 
organize themselves to cope with the flow of business generated by international 
organizations…which may help to determine governmental priorities and nature of 
…other arrangements within governments” (cited in Boli and Lechner, 2004: 82).
In this research, neoliberal approach is the other useful mean to evaluate 
energy policies of Turkey with the EU and Russia. According to neoliberalism, 
common and economic interests, international integration and utilizing technologic 
progresses along with adaptation to world markets are leading motivations for states 
while forming their energy policies. In this regard, dominant tools are market 
widening, integration into international institutions and organization, invoking 
common policies. As mentioned in one of the paragraphs above, in neoliberalism, 
absolute gains are important. Especially energy relations between Turkey, and the 
EU and Russia with respect to economic and demand-supply relations, regional 
energy policies will be analyzed according to neoliberal approach. Preferences and 
joint actions within the energy framework are the key elements of this research with 
respect to neoliberalism. In this sense, expected outcome according to neoliberalism 
would be medium cooperation in the axis of economic and common interests. Along 
with these interests, negotiations will be one of the basic tools in cooperation.
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1.4. Plan of the Book
As methodology, this thesis relies mainly on the textual analysis. Although 
the analyses of energy relation between Turkey and the three countries are 
categorized as case study, this thesis does not aim to compare and contrast these 
cases, yet it tries to give a broader explanation of the each relation and effects 
through theories. In order to give a clear understanding of the research, official 
documents and agreements are analyzed for each case. For the analysis of Turkish –
American relations, Action Plans, Economic Partnership Commission Action Items, 
Shared Vision and Structured Dialogue to Advance the Turkish – American Strategic 
Partnership Agreement; for the analysis of Turkish – the EU relations, progress 
reports, the Acquis Communautaire and Accession Partnership Programme and for 
the Turkish – Russian energy relations, reports of government institutions and 
companies are the main sources constituting the backbone of textual analysis of these 
relations. In addition to these, statistical data and concrete numbers are utilized for a 
better analysis of the international energy issue.
Turkey’s energy outlook is discussed in the second chapter of the thesis. 
Starting from general outlook, in this chapter, oil, gas, nuclear and renewables are 
respectively outlined. This chapter enables the research to have a sophisticated 
analysis of formation of Turkey’s energy policies with respect to its interests taking 
allies and neighboring countries as foci in the framework of Turkey’s foreign policy 
in the following chapters and concludes with an explanation how the information 
given in this chapter is going to be used in the following chapters.
The third, fourth and fifth chapter examines these three cases in a detailed 
way. The aim of these three chapters is to give main elements, situations and 
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circumstances of Turkey’s energy relations with these countries. Additionally how 
energy relations between Turkey and these main actors affect Turkey’s energy affairs 
with neighboring countries is one of the main questions which are answered with 
concrete examples.
The third chapter draws attention to energy relations between Turkey and the 
USA, basically mentioning the arguments, stated above, in a detailed way. This 
chapter uses neorealism to explain Turkish – American energy relations.  In this 
chapter explanatory power of “relative gains” concept, maximization of interests of 
sovereign states, rationality assumption, are the basic tools to explain the relations. 
Cooperation between Turkey and the USA is observed; yet it is weak in harmony; 
and is limited due to maximization of interests and effort of the USA to maintain its 
status quo regarding the Caspian and the Middle East. The chapter explains the 
nature of Turkish – American relations as a conclusion.
The fourth chapter touches upon energy relations between Turkey and the 
EU. The main reason of use of neoliberalism in this analysis is the explanation of key 
actors in the world system. The EU is a supranational actor and Turkey is a state. 
Unlike neorealism, interactions do not take place at interstate level, but also in
intergovernmental and transnational levels. Interdependence between common needs 
in energy sector puts forth cooperation. The chapter continues to touch upon absolute 
gain and collective policy assumption of neoliberalism and ends with an explaining 
how Turkey is important to the EU regarding energy. 
The fifth chapter explains energy policies between Turkey and the Russian 
Federation. As in the forth chapter, in this chapter neoliberalism is the theory chosen 
to explain Turkish – Russian energy relations. This chapter mainly focuses on 
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complex interdependence theory which a sub – variant of neoliberalism. The scope 
of analysis focuses on increased cooperation, common interests in economic affairs; 
whereas the unit level of analysis is not only examined at interstate level; yet the 
effect of transnational relations, with specific examples from private companies in 
energy sector are also explained. This chapter ends with a conclusion which seeks an 
answer to the question about if there is dependence or interdependence between 
Turkey and Russia.
The final and sixth chapter is the conclusion part of the thesis. This part is the 
main part of the thesis – which combines addressed points in the second, third, fourth 
and fifth chapters. This chapter is the part which merges and concludes descriptive 
and analytical parts of the thesis. The conclusion echoes the analyses which are put 
forward through the whole paper and ends up with the overall assessment of how 
energy issues affect relations of Turkey with the three countries. 
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CHAPTER II
   TURKEY’S ENERGY PROFILE
This chapter seeks to set out Turkey’s energy profile with diagrams and 
graphs. Referring energy profile, this chapter gives explanation of current situations 
about oil, gas, nuclear and renewable energy resources from which Turkey utilize for 
its domestic energy needs. Then, the chapter briefly addresses energy routes passing 
through Turkey.
2.1. Turkey’s Energy Profile
According to Turkish Statistical Institute, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (by 
production approach) of Turkey is 620 billion US Dollars by 2009. GDP of Turkey is 
composed of industry and manufacturing with an approximate ratio of 30 percent 
(including construction sector with a ratio of 4 percent), agriculture (approximately 
10 percent), and services with a ratio of 62 percent (Chamber of Mechanical 
Engineers, 2009: 1). Among Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
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Development (OECD) countries, Turkey has one of the fastest growing economies9. 
Due to this, Turkey’s domestic energy demand has been increasing. “Turkey’s 
economy is highly energy intensive – achieving rates that are significantly higher 
than most OECD countries” (Shaffer, 2006: 98). The share of energy remains to be 
in the first five components in the government spending following transportation, 
agriculture and education; and there has been an increasing trend in investments for 
energy10 (State Planning Organization, 2010). “Turkey’s energy policy has been 
highly supply – oriented, with emphasis replaced on ensuring additional supply to 
meet the growing demand (while energy efficiency has been a lower priority)” 
(International Energy Agency [IEA], 2005: 12).
Figure I – Sectors in Energy Consumption
Source: IEA, 2005; 53.
As shown in the figure I, the largest oil consuming sector is and is presumed 
                    
9 Nevertheless Turkey has the lowest GDP per capita among OECD countries. Besides, it is evident 
that financial crisis of 2008 has negatively affected Turkish economy and due to the crisis Turkey 
faced recession especially in the first and second quarter of 2009. According to statistics of Turkish 
Statistical Institute, GDP at current prices in given quarters decreased by 2.7 percent and 4 percent. 
However it is assumed that starting from the third quarter, Turkey entered into a recovery and in the 
fourth quarter GDP growth rate at current prices was 8 percent.
10 Only in 2003 and 2004 there was a slight decrease in investments for energy sector, according to 
current prices (State Planning Organization, 2010).
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to be the industry (according to 2003 statistics of the IEA in Energy Policies of IEA 
Countries – Turkey, the share is 45 percent)11, followed by the residential sector (31 
percent), transport (19 percent), and “other” sectors, namely commercial, public 
service and agricultural sectors (4.8 percent) (IEA, 2005: 52). 
Consumption of primary energy resources in Turkey (coal, firewood, 
petroleum, natural gas, renewable energy) has been rising, conversely domestic 
production of these resources do not meet this rising level of consumption. As the 
figure II shows below, there has been an emphatic gap between domestic energy 
supply and demand. Especially after 2001, there has been an increasing trend in 
energy demand.
Figure II – Evolution of Energy Domestic Supply and Demand in Turkey
Source: Chamber of Mechanical Engineers, 2009: 12
Turkey, having limited sufficient domestic sources of energy, imports 
approximately 75 percent of the energy it consumes (Republic of Turkey Ministry of
Energy and Natural Resources, 2010: 13). Turkey produces small amounts of oil, 
                    
11 The most energy consuming branches of industrial sectors are iron and steel sectors, then chemicals 
and petrochemicals, followed by textile and leather industries. Besides, use of energy for 
transportation has grown significantly throughout the last two decades. 
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natural gas and poor quality coal. Among these primary energy resources, oil 
composes approximately 8 percent of total energy produced; meanwhile natural gas 
composes only 3 percent (Türkyılmaz, n.d.: 5). Currently Turkey does not have any 
nuclear power (U.S. Energy Information Administration [EIA], 2009: 1). Conversely 
overall energy consumption increases year by year. In 2008, oil consumption 
composed 31.5 percent of total Turkish energy consumption, meanwhile natural gas 
consumption was 31.5 percent, coal consumption was 29.6 percent; and consumption 
of hydroelectric and other renewables was 7.4 percent (BP, June 2009).
Figure III – Ratio of dependence of Turkey on external energy resources
Source: Republic of Turkey Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, 2010: 13
As figured above (Figure III), Turkey’s dependence on imported energy has 
been increasing year by year (Although there is a decrease in 2008, the ratio still 
remains to be as a significant proof of dependence on imported energy resources). 
Since domestic energy supply does not meet Turkey’s demand for energy, 
percentage of imported energy products increase. The Table I, below, points out how 
the Turkey’s energy profile has been altered throughout the years in the last two 
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decades. As mentioned before, since the domestic supply cannot meet the increasing 
demand, as the table puts out ratio of domestic supply to demand has been 
decreasing. Even in 2001, although demand diminished significantly compared to 
other years, the ratio of domestic supply to demand decreased. 
Table I – Evolution of Energy Supply – Demand – Export and Import in Turkey
(thousand 
MTOE)
1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Demand 52987 636679 80501 75403 78354 83826 87818 91362 99590 107625
Production 25656 26749 26156 24681 24324 23783 24332 24549 26802 27453
Import 30936 39779 56342 52780 58629 65239 67885 73480 80514 87614
Export 2104 1947 1584 2620 3162 4090 4022 5171 6572 6925.5
Bunker 355 464 467 624 1233 644 631 628 588 91.71





48.1% 42.0 % 33.1% 32.6% 31% 28.4% 27.7% 26.9% 26.9% 25.5%
Source: Türkyılmaz, (n.d.): 6
In the following sections, oil, natural gas, nuclear energy, electricity and 
renewable energy sectors are analyzed. Thus, in this section of the chapter, only 
these primary energy resources are examined.
2.1.1. Petroleum
Share of petroleum in primary energy resources used in Turkey has the 
second rank (with 29.9 percent following natural gas) among other resources 
(Chamber of Mechanical Engineers, 2009: 10). Although Turkey, due to its 
geographic region, borders oil rich countries, it is not bestowed with rich oil reserves. 
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As stated above, domestic oil production remains to be very insufficient to supply the 
increasing demand for energy. In the last decade, it is observed there has been a 
decrease in domestic oil production by 24 percent (Republic of Turkey Ministry of 
Energy and Natural Resources, 2008d: 8). Non-discovery of new oil fields and aging 
of the current oil fields from which oil production has still been sustained are major 
contributing factors for this decline.
Figure IV – Domestic Crude Oil Production (Million barrels)
Source: Republic of Turkey Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, 2010: 27
Figure V – Overseas Crude Oil Production (Million Barrels)
Source: Republic of Turkey Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, 2010: 27
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On the other hand, oil fields in Turkey are not the only fields where Turkish 
oil companies extract oil. Turkish Petroleum Corporation (in Turkish: Türkiye 
Petrolleri Anonim Ortaklığı [TPAO]) extracts oil in Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan (Shah 
Deniz, Guneshli and Alov) and Libya12 (World Energy Council – Turkish National 
Committee [WEC – TNC], 2009: 18). However, overseas crude oil production is not 
sufficient (along with the domestic production). Thus in the 2010 – 2014 Strategic 
Plan of the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources of Turkey it is stated that until 
2014, overseas production will be doubled from 10 thousand to 20 thousand barrels.
Turkey supplies its petroleum demands from its imports. Thus Turkey has 
been trying to increase the number of international projects to feed its petroleum 
needs. In the 2010 – 2014 Strategic Plan (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Energy and 
Natural Resources, 2010: 30), it is specifically mentioned to double crude oil 
reaching Ceyhan by international projects.
2.1.2 Natural Gas
Natural gas leads the primary energy resources used in Turkey with a 
percentage of 31.8 (Chamber of Mechanical Engineers, 2009: 10). Due to the fact 
that demand for energy rises year by year, Turkey, having limited amounts of natural 
gas reserves within its borders13, imports significant amounts of natural gas. In 
                    
12 TPAO tries to enlarge number of fields of international exploration and production in Iraq and Syria
(Turkish Petroleum Corporation, 2008)
13 In 1999, Turkey started producing natural gas from Northern Marmara and Değirmenköy regions. 
In 2002, in Thracian region, TPAO with Amity Oil discovered natural gas reserves (Ministry of 
Energy and Natural Resources, 2008d: 8). It is assumed that Akçakoca (recently discovered natural 
gas reserve) and other fields in Thracian region will yield a positive shift in the domestic production 
of natural gas in coming years. In addition to this, Turkey is involved in overseas natural gas 
production. Amount of overseas production of natural gas has been gently increased since 2006 till the 
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Turkey, natural gas production is 1 million cubic meters per year, conversely 
consumption is 36 million cubic meters. When this significant production and 
consumption gap is taken into consideration, it becomes evident that Turkey is 97.3 
percent dependent to external natural gas resources (Republic of Turkey Ministry of 
Energy and Natural Resources, 2010: 25). 
Turkey uses most of the natural gas it imports for electricity. Following 
electricity, the second use of natural gas is manufacturing and industry. Residential 
consumption and consumption in commercial and public services take the third rank 
in use of natural gas (IEA, 2007). 















2000 10.082 3.594 704 151 14.531
2001 10.928 114 3.626 1.198 15.866
2002 11.574 660 3.722 1.139 17.095
2003 11.229 1.231 3.461 3.794 1.107 20.822
2004 10.919 3.183 3.498 3.182 1.016 21.798
2005 12.639 4.885 4.248 3.815 1.013 136 26.736
2006 12.038 7.278 5.594 4.211 1.099 87 30.307
2007 13.565 9.188 6.054 1.258 3.255 1.396 1.117 40 35.873
2008 13.156 9.806 4.113 4.580 4.220 1.017 333 895 38.120
2009 7.680 9.527 5.253 4.960 4.486 903 259 33.068
Source: Republic of Turkey Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, 2010: 26
                                                          
end of 2009 (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, 2010: 26). However 
domestic and overseas productions meet only approximately 3 percent of overall natural gas demand.
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Turkey fulfills its natural gas needs mainly from 5 countries. Two – thirds of 
imports are from one country. The Table II sheds light specifically which country 
Turkey imports most of its natural gas from. Russia is the leading natural gas 
exporter country, holding a share of 63 percent in Turkey’s natural gas imports. Iran 
is ranked as the second with a percentage of 15.5, followed by Azerbaijan with a 
percentage of 7.9. Besides natural gas delivered through pipelines, Turkey also 
imports liquefied natural gas (LNG) from Nigeria and Algeria (WEC – TNC, 2009: 
20).
2.1.3. Nuclear Energy
Due to volatility in energy prices after energy crisis of 1974, limits of fossil 
fuel resources, increasing carbon dioxide emissions along with limitations in energy 
production to meet the demand, and necessity for energy supply security, nuclear 
energy has become an important alternative energy resource. It is claimed that 
nuclear energy extends important benefits to meet energy needs, significantly 
reduces the problem of air pollution and reduces overdependence on external energy 
sources.
In order to reduce dependence of Turkey on external resources of energy and 
to form alternative sources for increasing demand, one of the main studies has been 
performed in nuclear energy. Hitherto Turkey did not have any nuclear power plant. 
However construction of nuclear energy plants is not recently-planned. Studies to 
construct a nuclear power plant in Turkey started in 1965. After feasibility studies, in 
1973, it was decided to build an 80 megawatt (MW) nuclear plant. However, in 1974 
the project was cancelled. In the years of 1974 and 1975 Gülnar-Akkuyu (Mersin) 
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location was selected suitable for the construction and this location was granted 
license in 1976. However, in September 1980, the project was cancelled due to 
withdrawal of loan guarantees from Swedish government which was one of the 
partners of the project. In 1990, nuclear power plant discussion came into question 
again to construct four nuclear plants; but the project was cancelled (Nuclear Energy 
Agency, 2008). In the early 2000s, nuclear plans were postponed due to economic 
turndown in Turkey. In 2006 Sinop was proposed as an alternative location to 
Akkuyu (World Nuclear Association, 2010). Licensing process for Sinop nuclear 
plant still continues. The first nuclear reactor is expected to start operating in 2017, 
and the others in successive years.
2.1.4 Renewable Energy
To feed rising energy demand with minimum damage to environment, Turkey 
has been seeking alternatives such as solar, wind, hydro power and biomass to other 
primary energy resources. The dominant objective of Turkey about renewable energy 
is to increase the share of renewable energy sources in overall electricity production 
to at least 30 percent by 2023 (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Energy and Natural 
Resources, 2010: 16). 
As shown in the Figure VI, renewable energy (according to 2008 statistics) 
composes only 9 percent of overall energy supply in Turkey. Among renewable 
energy sources, hydropower, with 18.5 percent, is the leading source in electricity 
generation. Both wind (0.78 percent) and geothermal (0.24 percent) have the least 
shares in electricity production (Chamber of Mechanical Engineers, 2009: 28).
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Figure VI – Shares of Supply of Primary Energy Resources in Turkey (2008)
Source: WEC – TNC, 2009: 29
By 2009, Turkey is ranked thirteenth country amongst G – 20 countries in 
renewable (clean) energy investment (The Pew Environment Group, 2009: 37). In 
order to enhance share of renewable energy resources in energy supply, it is aimed to 
increase installed capacity of all renewable resources by the end of 2013, by utilizing 
from advanced technology and adoption of legal amendments in the envisaged period 
of time Republic of Turkey Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, 2010: 16 –
17).
2.1.5 Electricity
In 2007, electricity consumption in Turkey (Electricity export is subtracted 
from total of electricity gross domestic production and electricity import) rose to 
190.0 billion kilo-watt/hour (kWh) by 8.8 percent increase, whereas in 2008, by 4.3 
percent increase, electricity consumption became 198.1 billion kWh (WEC – TNC, 
30
2009: 59). 
As a growing economy, electricity demand in Turkey has been increasing 
year by year. However, due to financial crisis which emerged in the second quarter 
of 2008, in 2009, Turkey faced a decrease in electricity demand by 2.17 percent 
(Chamber of Mechanical Engineers, 2009: 24). On the other hand, it is expected to 
increase starting from 2010.
Figure VII – Electricity Demand
Source: WEC – TNC, 2009: 60
As pointed out in the Table –III, electricity, in Turkey, is mostly produced 
from thermal power plants which composes hydro, geothermal and wind powers. 
Among them, hydro power ranks the first energy source for thermal power plants. 
The second major source of electricity generation is natural gas (excluding LNG) of 
which Turkey is over dependent on imports.
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Table III – Electricity Generation According to Sources
Source: WEC – TNC, 2009: 68
Due to increasing demand for energy, in a few years time, nuclear power will 
be listed amongst electricity generating resources. Ascending number of installation 
and construction of renewable power plants, growing geothermal potential along 
with other renewables such as biomass, are expected to meet the electricity demand. 
2.2 Energy Routes in Turkey
Regarding the proven oil reserves, the Middle East has 754 billion barrels 
(bb) and the Former Soviet Union (FSU) countries have 127.8 bb. On the other hand, 
the EU, within the continent, has the least oil reserves; the amount is 6.3 bb. In gas 
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reserves, the Middle East is again the leading region with 75.91 trillion cubic meters 
[tcm]; in the meantime the FSU has 57 tcm. Conversely the EU has 2.87 tcm –which 
is negligible when compared to the other regions (BP, 2009: 8, 24).
Turkey lies adjacent to countries or a region possessing about 74.8 percent of 
the world’s proven gas and 72.6 percent of the world’s proven oil reserves 
(Petroleum Pipeline Corporation, 2008: 12, 13). Around 3.7 percent of the world’s 
daily oil consumption is shipped through the Turkish straits (European Commission, 
n.d.: 1). “The United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (in Report on global 
energy security and the Caspian Sea Region: Country Profiles, 2006) has estimated 
that Turkey may host 6 – 7 percent of global oil transport by 2012” (Tekin and 
Williams, 2009: 4). Thus Turkey plays an active role in pipeline projects to become a 
pipeline – based transit country.
In this sense, the following section of this chapter gives compendious 
explanation of the pipeline projects (either oil or gas) which are closely related the 
next chapter in which Turkey’s energy relations with its allies are analyzed.
2.2.1 Iraq – Turkey (Kirkuk – Ceyhan) Crude Oil Pipeline 
The Kirkuk – Ceyhan Pipeline is Iraq’s largest crude oil export pipeline. The 
capacity of the pipeline has been increased throughout the years since the year it 
became operational. (In 1976 the capacity was 35 Million tons, and then was 
increased to 46.5 Million tons/year through the First Expansion Project in 1984. With 
the completion of the Second Pipeline in 1987, which is parallel to the first one, the 
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annual capacity reached 70.9 Million tons. Currently it transports 135,522 Thousand 
barrels of oil (Petroleum Pipeline Corporation, 2008: 22).
2.2.2 Baku – Tbilisi – Ceyhan (BTC) Crude Oil Pipeline
“The central component of the East- West Energy Corridor is the BTC 
pipeline, which is a dedicated crude oil pipeline system that extends from Azeri –
Chirag – Deepwater Gunashli (ACG) field through Azerbaijan and Georgia to a 
terminal at Ceyhan on the Mediterranean coast of Turkey, bypassing the 
environmentally sensitive Black Sea and the Turkish Straits” (European Commission, 
n.d.: 1). BTC pipeline, which has a length of 1,730 kilometers (km), became 
operational in 2006 (Domanic. (n.d.): 6). Since 2006 oil flow through the pipeline has 
steadily increased, by the end of 2009, 287 million barrels of oil per year reached the 
world markets through this pipeline (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Energy and 
Natural Resources, 2010: 29). “By creating the first direct pipeline link between the 
landlocked Caspian Sea and the Mediterranean, the BTC project brings positive 
economic advantage to the region and avoids increasing oil traffic through the 
vulnerable Turkish Straits” (BP, n.d.). Proximity of Turkey to the Caspian region 
enables Turkey to overplay its geopolitical card with respect to East – West Energy 
Corridor since it lies in the transit routes for Caspian oil and gas (Müftüler – Bac, 
2000: 498). In addition to these, “BTC is the first pipeline specifically designed to 
export Caspian oil without going through Russia” (Barysch, 2007: 3). In this sense, 
proposed Trans Caspian oil pipeline, aiming to enable Kazakhstani oil to reach world 
markets bypassing Russia, is another key element to strengthen importance of BTC if 
this proposed project is linked to the BTC.
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2.2.3 Samsun – Ceyhan Crude Oil Pipeline Project
Samsun–Ceyhan pipeline is a planned crude oil pipeline in Turkey from 
Samsun on the Black Sea coast to Ceyhan on the Mediterranean coast. The length of 
the pipeline will be 550 km and capacity is 1.5 million barrels per day. The pipeline 
is scheduled to become operational in 2012 (IEA, 2006: 11). 
The aim of the project is to provide a different route for oil imported from 
Russia and Kazakhstan and to bypass Turkish Straits. Ships passing through the 
Straits annually carry 120 million barrels of oil. Tanker traffic in the Straits is 
expected to decrease by 50% when the Samsun–Ceyhan pipeline becomes 
operational (Today’s Zaman, 2006). In addition to these, it is proposed to construct 
gas pipeline parallel to the Samsun – Ceyhan oil pipeline to carry out Blue Stream 2.
2.2.4 Baku – Tbilisi – Erzurum Gas Pipeline
Baku – Tbilisi – Erzurum Gas Pipeline, which is considered as the second 
component of the East-West Energy Corridor along with the BTC, became 
operational in July 2007. The pipeline transports 6.6 bcm (a year) of natural gas from 
the Shah Deniz field in Azerbaijan, through Georgia. “It is also considered as the 
first leg of the Trans-Caspian Natural Gas Pipeline Project which will tap into the 
world’s 4th largest natural gas reserves located in Turkmenistan and those in 
Kazakhstan” (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2009a: 4).
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2.2.5 Blue Stream Gas Pipeline
The Blue Stream is a gas pipeline designed to deliver Russian gas to Turkey 
across the Black Sea, bypassing third countries. The pipeline, which is 1.213 km
long, became operational in 2003. “Blue Stream was due to deliver [7.5 bcm in 2006] 
10 bcm in 2007, with its full capacity of 16 bcm scheduled to be reached in 2010” 
(Barysch, 2007: 3).
It is stressed (on Gazprom’s web-page) that in addition to gas transportation 
to Turkey, Blue Stream can also be ‘gas transmission corridor’ for other countries. In 
this sense, there have been ongoing discussions to extend the Blue Stream as Blue 
Stream 2 to alternative regions. The first alternative is to expand Blue Stream to the 
EU through Bulgaria, Serbia, and Croatia, ending with underground gas storage in 
Hungary (Alexander’s Gas and Oil Connections, 2007a). On the other hand, the other 
option for Blue Stream 2 is highlighted as an extension of gas delivery to the Middle 
East, Israel and other countries within the region (on Gazprom’s web-page).
2.2.6 Turkey – Greece – Italy Interconnector
This project is basically project which takes Caspian gas through Turkey. 
“Greece and Turkey built a two-way pipeline interconnection between 2005 and 
2007 able carry up to 12 bcm of (primarily Caspian) natural gas to Europe” (Tekin 
and Williams, 2009: 7). Despite the fact that Italy – Greece pipeline has not been 
operational yet, the Turkey – Greece – Italy Interconnector is planned to supply West 
Balkan Pipeline and Trans – Adriatic Pipeline. Turkey – Greece Pipeline, which 
became operational in 2007, is a 296 km long natural gas pipeline of which 209 km 
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is within the territory of Turkey (Alexander’s Gas and Oil Connections, 2007:b). The 
Greece – Italy section of the pipeline started to be constructed in 2009 and is 
envisaged to be operational in 2012. 
2.2.7 Trans Caspian Gas Pipeline Project
The aim of the proposed Trans Caspian Gas Pipeline Project (also known as;
Turkmenistan-Turkey-Europe Natural Gas Pipeline Project) is to transport gas from 
Turkmenistan via the Caspian Sea to Turkey and then to Europe. “According to this 
Agreement, 30 Bcma of Turkmen gas would be transported through this pipeline, 
with 16 Bcma being supplied to Turkey and the remainder to Europe” (Petroleum 
Pipeline Corporation, 2008: 54). 
2.2.8 Iraq – Turkey Natural Gas Pipeline Project
This pipeline was planned to transport Iraqi natural gas from northeastern Iraq 
to Turkey. Although the agreement of the project was signed in 1996, it has been 
delayed due to sanctions of the United Nations during that period (Petroleum 
Pipeline Corporation, 2008: 54).
Turkey is currently trying to enlarge the scope of the project due to increasing 
demand of Europe. The ultimate purpose of the Project is firstly to transport Iraqi gas 
to Turkey and subsequently to Europe through Turkey. The Memorandum of 
Understanding of August 7, 2007 between Turkey and Iraq the parties declared their 
intention to transport Iraqi gas to Europe through Turkey (Petroleum Pipeline 
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Corporation, 2008: 54).
2.2.9 Nabucco Natural Gas Pipeline Project
“The Nabucco project represents a new gas pipeline connecting the Caspian 
region, the Middle East and Egypt (and maybe Qatar) via Turkey, Bulgaria, 
Romania, and Hungary with Austria and further on with the Central and Western 
European gas markets. The pipeline length is approximately 3,300 km, starting at the 
Georgian/Turkish and/or Iranian/Turkish border respectively, leading to Baumgarten 
in Austria” (Nabucco Gas Pipeline Project, n.d.). According to market studies, the 
pipeline has been designed to transport a maximum amount of 31 bcm/y from 
Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and other Caspian resources; in addition to these, 
transportation of natural gas from Iraq and Egypt through Syria is among the long 
term plans (Mitschek, 2009: 8; Petroleum Pipeline Corporation, 2008: 51).
The construction process is planned to start between Ankara and Baumgarten, 
and then it is planned to connect existing pipelines between Georgia-Turkey and 
Iran-Turkey to the newly-constructed pipeline. Although the construction was 
predicted to start in January 2008, it has been delayed to January 2011 (Pamir, 2009). 
The Nabucco Company started prequalification tender for long term items for 
construction on April 23, 2010 (Nabucco Gas Pipeline Project, April 23, 2010). 
2.3. Turkey’s Energy Profile and Analyses
The energy outlook of Turkey is given to enable the following chapters to 
explain energy relations of Turkey with the USA, the EU and Russia in a detailed 
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way. This chapter yields to have better linkages between the arguments and “why”s 
of the thesis. Basically it is evident that as a growing economy, Turkey’s overall 
energy consumption, thus demand, increases. Considerably high percentage of 
overall energy demand is met from external resources. Thus this causes Turkey’s 
energy policies to be supply – oriented. For petroleum and natural gas, Turkey is 
over – dependent on imports. Since Turkey does not have enough technological 
progress in nuclear technology, the nuclear sources which are expected to decrease 
Turkey’s dependency on imported oil and gas are also dependent on technology 
imported. In the meantime, the major energy type, electricity, is today generated by 
natural gas; and is expected to be generated by nuclear energy in the sooner future. 
On the other hand, renewable energy – which is considered as another tool to 
decrease dependency on external resources, is unfortunately not enough to meet 
considerable amount of energy demand. This information about the energy profile of 
Turkey is mainly important for the analyses of energy relations of Turkey with the 
EU and Russia. Basically Turkey’s over – dependency on external resources 
provides the reasons of Turkey’s increasing trade with Russia. This information also 
provides the scope of the relations of Turkey and Russia and exactly in which fields 
they are cooperating for. As for the EU, this chapter enables the following chapters 
to discuss the common needs and targets in energy. Increasing demand in the EU –
as in Turkey – pushes them to seek common and collective policies to gain mutual 
benefits from cooperation.
The pipelines and pipeline projects mentioned in the chapter stands as a good 
tool analyze all of the three cases in this thesis. Since Turkey and the USA do not 
have direct energy relations, brief explanations of the pipelines deepens the meaning 
of the arguments in the related regions of the world, whereas energy relations of 
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Turkey with the EU and Russia has also the same scope other than the cooperation 
and increasing economic linkages due to dependency on energy and demands. The 
information about pipelines is used to explain arguments in a detailed way since this 
chapter provides information about important issues regarding the pipeline, such as 
the path, countries they pass though and shareholder
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CHAPTER III
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND TURKEY
Turkey and the USA are two countries which have strategic relations in favor 
of promoting spread of stability and peace; and fighting against terrorism and 
fundamentalism. Especially when contemporary cases are discussed, it will be 
obvious that Turkey and the USA act jointly for crisis prevention and management; 
and combating terrorism. In addition to these joint actions regarding maintenance of 
security and stability especially in the Middle East region, Turkey and the USA also 
liaise for economic relations especially within the context of energy. In this chapter, 
after shedding light to an overview of energy relations of Turkey with the USA, how 
the USA influences relations with three neighbors of Turkey; Iraq, Iran and 
Azerbaijan (with a general explanation of the contemporary situation of the 
Caspian/South Caucuses) is discussed. 
“In 1997, Turkey and the U.S. decided to formulate their mutual cooperation 
under a ‘five item agenda’ "(Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
2009f). Energy, economy and trade, regional cooperation, (along with Cyprus, and 
defense and security cooperation) were amongst these five item agenda. Starting 
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from 1999, the name of the relationship between Turkey and the USA has been 
defined as "strategic partnership", meaning that the expansive cooperation is multi-
dimensional and multi-faceted, involving a wide range of overlapping strategic 
interests in Europe, the Caucasus, Central Asia and the Middle East. (Republic of 
Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2009f). In addition to cooperation for defense 
and security, relations in the fields of economy, trade and commerce as well, 
witnessed development in the last decade. In this context, “the launch of the regular 
energy and trade dialogues, cooperation for the safe transportation of the Caspian 
energy resources to world markets and the growing interest of U.S. companies in 
Turkey, manifest the solid convergence of views and interests” (Republic of Turkey, 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2009f).
Table IV - Turkey’s Major Exported Goods and Commodities to the USA
(Million US dollars) 2006 2007 2008
Garment and textile products (fabrics, knitting, home textiles, yarn, 
fabrics, carpets, rugs, leather products)
1.332 1.151 883
Steel and iron products (long and flat products, tubes, pipes) 925 322 785
Machinery, Electrical and Mechanical Equipment (boilers, machinery 
and equipment, household appliances, motor fittings, pumps, hardware 
products)
331 395 437
Petroleum oils (heavy and light), Petroleum Gas (ethylene, propylene, 
butane)
383 317 42214
Source: Undersecretariat of the Prime Ministry for Foreign Trade, 2009a: 3
                    
14 As Turkey’s petroleum exports to the USA are relatively low, petroleum goods and products 
imported from the USA is completely negligible, whereas the trade volume between Turkey and 
Russia is significantly increasing (For instance; according to statistics of the Undersecretariat of the 
Prime Ministry for Foreign Trade (2009: 6), Turkey’s energy imports from Russia is approximately 11 
billion dollars in 2008.
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With regards to energy relations between these two countries, it can be stated 
that Turkey and the USA do not have direct relations concerning energy, as Turkey 
has with either Russia or the EU. Trade of energy resources or energy goods between 
Turkey and the USA is comparably low. As figured out in Table IV, it becomes 
evident that petroleum products are ranked as the fourth among exported good and 
commodities of Turkey to the USA.
Energy relations between these two countries rather rely on influence and 
support of the USA on Turkey’s role for secure transportation routes for efficient 
energy from regions which are rich in oil and gas; Caspian and the Middle East. Thus 
energy relations between these countries are not direct; but related to mutual scarcity 
interests. The Undersecretariat of the Prime Ministry for Foreign Trade (2008) also 
explains energy relations of Turkey with the USA as an important field for bilateral 
cooperation. The most significant example of cooperation for energy was pointed as 
Baku – Tbilisi – Ceyhan pipeline. The other US – backed pipeline projects which are 
planned to bring energy resources in Caspian to world markets are also considered as 
element for strong cooperation in energy relations.
In bilateral relations between Turkey and the USA, there are various action 
plans, memorandums and declarations, promoting cooperation in every field such as 
politics, development, share of information and technology; and also energy. For 
instance, an Action Plan which identifies areas of cooperation, such as universities, 
science & technology and energy projects, was adopted in 2008. Yet the energy 
aspects of these agreements do not focus on trade of energy goods and commodities; 
but actualization and projection of international energy projects regarding energy 
security. In one of the meetings of the Economic Partnership Commission (EPC) of 
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Turkey and the USA, the issue of energy security was given significant importance.
It is evident that apart from cooperation for energy routes from oil and gas rich 
regions to demanding markets, joint action for nuclear energy is another example of 
cooperation – which should also be compendiously touched upon. Both Turkey and 
the USA also reached a consensus on the need for enhanced cooperation on nuclear 
energy (Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2008, 2). The Agreement 
for Cooperation Concerning the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy between Turkey 
and the USA was signed in Ankara on July 26, 2000. Due to ratification and 
legislation process of the two countries in accordance with the agreement, it entered 
into force on June 2, 2008. In addition to information and transfer of nuclear research 
and development for peaceful purposes, use of technology, materials, equipment and 
components for cooperation in nuclear energy field were also expounded upon 
(Turkish Atomic Energy Authority, 2009). In EPC Actions Items 2008 – 2009, 
regarding energy supply security and diversification, it is stated for the USA to 
promote cooperation with Turkey on civilian power technology. Besides, the USA is 
expected to explore potential for exchange of scientists and technical experts from 
Turkish Atomic Energy Authority and US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) 
and US Department of Energy national laboratories, in the meantime to continue the 
consultations between the USA and the relevant Turkish authorities; whereas Turkey 
is anticipated to conduct workshop in Turkey on energy conservation (Republic of 
Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2009e: 2).
On the other hand, every energy oriented project in which Turkey is involved 
is not given full US support. Rapprochement between Turkey and Iran does not 
correspond to aims of the USA regarding the Middle East. When tension between 
Iran and the USA is analyzed, it will be obvious that increasing cooperation of 
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Turkey and Iran will unsettle the American policy makers. Meanwhile Iraq has been 
an unsolved issue for the USA. Impacts of inefficient and insufficient oil 
transportation from Iraq to Turkey, and support of the USA to the regional 
government of the Northern Iraq create question marks about how the balance of 
power in politics affects these energy relations. In this sense neo – realism is used to 
underline the reasons of policies and polities implemented regarding energy affairs 
between these countries.
3.1 Turkey – Caspian (Azerbaijan) – the USA Triangle
After the dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), the 
Western countries were seeking ways to integrate recently independent states of 
Caspian, Caucasus and Central Asia, since “until 1989, this region lay fully within 
the Soviet orbit” (Tekin and Williams, 2009c: 423). In addition to introducing them 
democracy and market economy, the possible easiest and mutually beneficial way to 
integrate them with the world was to enable them to use their rich energy resources 
which many of the Western countries were demanding. During the bipolar system of 
international relations (the USA and the USSR), the developed countries which were 
not rich of oil and gas resources, were suffering Socialist monopoly on natural 
resources of the Caspian, Caucasus and the Central Asia (in USSR era, all pipelines, 
exporting oil and gas to the West, were planned to be constructed within the 
territories of today’s Russian Federation. Thus after dissolution of USSR, new 
pipelines had to be constructed to break down the Russian monopoly on 
transportation of Caspian energy to the West).  Thus energy became an important 
tool of the policies toward these regions. On the other hand, the Russian Federation, 
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the successor of the USSR, was aiming to re-maintain its dominance on these 
independent countries of Caspian, Caucasus and Central Asia. 
The best and the most reliable way to connect these newly independent states 
was Turkey. Therefore there were energy policies, in other words pipeline politics, 
which were Western – backed. These projects were basically aiming to by – pass the 
Russian Federation and to increase energy diversification routes of the Western 
developed countries. In this sense, as the hegemonic power, the USA has been 
supporting Turkey to become a major energy center for the sources coming from 
especially Caspian. 
Turkey and the USA signed many agreements and memorandums to deepen 
their cooperation with regards to energy politics in the Caspian. Turkey became a 
major strategic partner of the USA in the region. One of the agreements which 
promote cooperation in energy between Turkey and the USA concerning the Caspian 
is Shared Vision and Structured Dialogue to Advance the Turkish – American 
Strategic Partnership Agreement of July 5, 2006. According to the Agreement, 
“Turkey and the USA pledges themselves to work together for (contributing to 
stability, democracy and prosperity in the Black Sea region, the Caucasus, Central 
Asia (and Afghanistan) enhancing energy security, through diversification of routes 
and sources including from the Caspian basin” (Republic of Turkey Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, 2006: 3). In the context of EPC meetings, “cooperation in the energy 
field between the two countries was highlighted; the importance of the Nabucco and 
Turkey-Greece-Italy pipeline, including the Southern Corridor and regional 
cooperation in oil and natural gas in the common interest were discussed” (Republic 
of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2008, 2). At the end of the meeting it was 
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decided to deepen and strengthen cooperation for gas transportation, meanwhile to 
ensure supply security for Turkey was amongst the other decisions taken (since 
diversification and security of energy supply sources and routes are important 
elements for Turkey – and Europe as well15). In the EPC Action Items 2008 – 2009, 
there have been mutual duties both two countries are expected to fulfill. The first one 
is to share information regarding ongoing and potential regional energy 
projects/initiatives. Continuation of work together to support regional efforts that will 
strengthen energy security, including the Nabucco Project which brings Caspian, and 
the Middle Eastern gas to the European markets, and the Turkey-Greece-Italy 
pipeline project (bringing Caspian gas to the demanding countries through Turkey) is 
the other element mentioned in the EPC Action Items. 
3.1.1 Major important pipelines for cooperation in the region
The Baku – Tbilisi – Ceyhan (BTC) Crude Oil Pipeline is the major step 
concerning Turkish – US cooperation in the Caspian. The pipeline brings Caspian 
(Azerbaijani) oil to Ceyhan port (Turkey) through Georgia. “The opening of the BTC 
pipeline and the upcoming connection of the Kazakh pipeline system to the BTC 
pipeline effectuate a double break16 of the Russian monopoly, a milestone in the 
diversification of energy flows from the east to the west. The dream of some Western 
political forces, especially the United States, of bringing Central Asian oil to the 
West by circumventing Russia has become true” (Weihe, 2007: 35).
                    
15 Reasons of importance of diversification and security for energy supply sources regarding Turkey 
and the EU are discussed in the following section, entitled Turkey – the European Union.
16 The paragraph starts with a compendious explanation of the Russian – Ukrainian crisis of 2006. It 
basically states that this crisis “brought the energy alliance with Russia into question” (Weihe, 2007: 
35). This is why the author mentions a double break of Russian monopoly.
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When history of the negotiation process for BTC pipeline is analyzed, the US 
support for Turkey’s role in transportation of the Caspian energy should be obvious 
at the first glance. “The competition over [possible] route to deliver oil from the 
Caspian Sea basin to the West is perhaps the most visible example of geopolitical 
competition between Russia and Turkey (and thus the USA)” (Bazoğlu – Sezer, 
2000: 72). Baku – Novorossiysk17 route, which Russia strictly supported, was the 
dominant rival against BTC. Upon pressure of Turkey, Baku - Supsa18 route, which 
was assumed to be the first step towards BTC pipeline, was also suggested to deliver 
early oil from Baku until the time the BTC pipeline became operational. Although 
many oil companies such as BP (UK), Chevron (USA), ConocoPhillips Company 
(USA) supported the Baku – Novorossiysk pipeline since that pipeline had efficient 
infrastructure, was already in operation and much more feasible than the proposed 
BTC pipeline, the US government of the given period completely refused Baku –
Novorossiysk route and backed up BTC. (Şen, 2009: 180 – 185, 215 – 220).
“The Russian lock on transport is being undermined by the BTC pipeline, 
bringing oil undermined by the BTC pipeline … and its twin Baku – Tbilisi –
Erzurum (BTE) [gas] pipeline, also known as the South Caucasus Pipeline (SCP)…” 
(Tekin and Williams, 2009c: 423, 424). Basically, support of the USA for the BTC 
pipeline is an obvious example for use of geostrategic advantage of Turkey which 
motivates the energy policies regarding Caspian according to neorealist thought. 
Although, as mentioned above, the multinational or transnational corporations were 
insisting on the rival project of BTC pipeline, the US government influenced the 
negotiation process of Baku early oil and gave the advantage to BTC. This is a basic 
                    
17 Novorossiysk is a city in the Southern Russia on Black Sea coast. This pipeline was constructed in 
Soviet era.
18 Supsa is a Black Sea port in the Western Georgia.
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example for identification of levels of units in the system. Unlike in neoliberalism, in 
neorealism, units are sovereign states and interactions take place at this level. Thus it 
can be stated that the USA which seeks survival and maximization of interests, chose 
to support BTC pipeline instead of Baku – Novorossiysk pipeline, whereas Turkey, a 
state maximizing its interests by BTC pipeline, chose to cooperate with the USA and 
tried to have the US government’s backing for the project.
The Nabucco Pipeline Project which “will connect Europe with various non –
Russian sources of gas from the East via Turkey” (Tekin and Williams, 2009c: 419), 
is another US backed project. The project is basically planned to decrease over 
dependency of the EU, in other words the West, on Russian energy resources. 
However due to economic, geopolitical and technical elements, Russian gas has been 
involved in the project19. On the other hand, as the USA and the EU oppose Russian 
gas to be involved in the project; since Russian involvement is completely against the 
nature of the project, does not correspond to expectations of energy consuming states 
from the project and strengthens Russian energy card over the West. In addition to 
these, the South Stream Project which is a rival of the Nabucco Gas Pipeline Project 
is also another alternative which actually creates negative aspects for diversification 
and energy security of the West. The South Stream Gas Pipeline Project20 delivers 
Russian gas to the European markets through the Black Sea. Since both the USA and 
the EU are willing to undermine Russian dominance in energy and to diversify their 
energy routes, the western countries are favoring the Nabucco Gas Pipeline Project 
over the South Stream Gas Pipeline Project.
                    
19 13 Reasons and possible outcomes of inclusion of Russian gas in the Nabucco Gas Pipeline Project; 
and rivalry between the Nabucco Gas Pipeline Project and the South Stream Gas Pipeline Project are 
discussed in the next section, entitled “the Russian Federation and Turkey” in a detailed way.
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In the meantime, the Nabucco Gas Pipeline Project stands as a key element, 
not only for the West; but for also Turkey. First of all, Turkey strengthens its energy 
card over Russia – which means; in neorealist approach, distribution of capabilities
and relative gains are very important; in this context, such a project as Nabucco, 
Russian gas – assumed to be not included in the project (although Russia has 
declared its interest in the project and the Nabucco Gas Pipeline Company lists 
Russia as a supplier country, there haven’t been any official documents enabling 
Russia to become a part of the project) – Turkey will increase its geopolitical 
advantage in energy security. Relative gains of Turkey either economically or 
politically will increase. Besides, Turkey will enjoy the advantage of regional 
cooperation with the USA which also supports Turkey’s accession into the EU, due 
to the fact that Turkey will be able to fully integrate the Western community, will 
become more than a strategic partner with regards to policies directed towards the 
Middle East.
3.1.2 Turkish – Armenian Normalization Talks
In this part of the section, without getting into political outcomes of the 
Turkish – Armenian normalization talks, how rapprochement of Turkey and Armenia 
would affect energy policies in the region is discussed.
The problem which gave birth to normalization talks by the end f 
2009originates after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Turkey recognized all the 
newly independent former-Soviet states, including Armenia. However, Turkey did 
not establish diplomatic relations due to the fact that Armenia does not recognize the 
Turkish Armenian border agreed by the Kars Agreement (1921) signed by and 
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between Turkey and the Soviet Union. The land border between Armenia and Turkey 
was closed as a reaction to the invasion of the Azerbaijani territory of Nagorno –
Karabakh by the Armenian forces in 1993 (Şen, 2009: 94).
Turkey and Armenia, which are the two parties of a long standing problem, 
signed protocols “in Zurich in October 2009 with participation of other international 
bigwigs from the USA, France, the EU and the Council of Europe” to improve 
relations, including various political joint actions (Torbakov, 2010: 32). Participation 
of these countries in the ceremony of signing is an evident proof that this 
rapprochement is supported by the Western countries. When the issue is analyzed in 
a detailed way, the first question coming into mind would be what would be the 
benefits to these countries which participated in the ceremony from the 
rapprochement. Aside from settling stability and peace in the region, there are other 
factors which enable these countries enjoying the advantages of such rapprochement. 
The war between Georgia and Russia in 2008 has proven that Russia has still been 
dominating in the politics and has been pursuing a goal of increasing its influence in 
South Caucasus or in other words the Caspian. As Russia, the successor of the 
USSR, tries to maintain its influence, conversely the Western countries try to 
increase cooperation and ensure energy security in the region. This competition and 
pursuit of power completely affect the balance of power in the region. Evidently the 
war between Georgia and Russia posed a serious threat and risk against efficiency of 
pipelines from Caspian – which are very significant for Western energy demands. 
Thus the situation in the region propelled Western countries to seek other routes for 
uninterrupted flow of oil and gas. In this context Turkish – Armenian normalization 
talks become very important since geographically Armenia – Turkey seem to be the 
new possible route for energy transportation. Armenia and Turkey lie in a region 
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which “connects Western markets to Central Asian energy routes and sources and 
offers energy suppliers other than Russia and Iranian monopolies to Europe” 
(Görgülü, 2009, 24). Basically, since a possible threat of cut – off of energy flow 
from the Caspian due to conflicts in the region, it is expected to observe [little] 
cooperation between states in order to enable them to take the advantage of 
geopolitical advantages of Armenia and Turkey – which has hitherto not been given 
significant geographical and geostrategic importance – for secure routes for energy 
transportation. 
On the other hand – aside from any possible political and diplomatic outcome 
of the normalization talks between Turkey and Armenia – although at the first glance 
Turkey seems to strengthen its energy card, since Armenia is also another 
prospective gate for connecting Caspian to pipelines going through Turkey, negative 
immediate effects of the Turkish – Armenian rapprochement have been observed. 
Azerbaijan, sister country of Turkey, has declared its harassment because of the 
rapprochement. Although Azerbaijan (which has a long – standing dispute over 
Nagorno – Karabakh with Armenia) used to set comparably low price for its gas 
exported to Turkey, in the last months of 2009, it declared that it will increase the 
prices of gas Turkey imports and decided to sell half billion cubic meters of gas from 
Shah Deniz (Shah Deniz is the main field which feeds pipelines going through 
Turkey) to Russia (Azerbaijan also stated that the amount of the gas could also be 
increased) and then to Iran, besides its decision to export liquefied natural gas (LNG)
extracted from Shah Deniz to Romania (Pamir, December 26, 2009; İlbaş, 2009a and 
Pamir, May 2, 2010). These declarations and decisions were interpreted as retaliation 
against the Turkish – Armenian normalization talks. Basically rapprochement 
between Turkey and Armenia which is backed up by the USA has affected 
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Azerbaijani – Turkish relations negatively.
3.2 Turkey – Iran – the USA Triangle
“The relations between Iran and the West are very difficult at the moment … 
because of the conflict about Iran’s nuclear ambitions…” (Weihe, 2007: 35). As 
mentioned, Iran’s nuclear program creates threat against the USA, the hegemonic 
power in the unipolar world system. Thus, Turkey, the neighbor of Iran and an ally 
of the USA, becomes a very important actor to cooperate against anti – civilian 
nuclear program and keep the status quo in the region. Concerning cooperation of 
Turkey and the US against nuclear activity of Iran, the Shared Vision and Structures 
Dialogue to advance the Turkish – American Strategic Partnership Agreement, which 
highlights support for diplomatic efforts regarding Iran’s nuclear program including 
the recent P5+1 initiative (Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006: 3), 
is one of the significant examples illustrating Turkey as an strategic partner of the 
USA against aggressive Iran.
On the other hand, there have been changes in the bilateral relations of 
Turkey and Iran in the last decade. After the dissolution of the USSR, Iran was 
willing to take the advantage of pipeline politics and due to this, Turkey and Iran 
became rivals to some extend (Ekinci, 2009; 2); yet Turkey and Iran relations have 
entered a new era in which close interactions and cooperation (especially) for energy 
have been observed in the last decade. In this context, this section aims to point out 
the main reasons of Turkish – Iranian cooperation within energy framework and then 
to highlight the US approach in neorealist thought.
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3.2.1 An overview of Turkish – Iranian Relations
Despite the fact that Iran has been living disputes over its nuclear program 
with the international community, continuity in Turkey – Iran political, economic 
and cultural relations have been preserved. Especially, economically Turkey – Iran 
relations in recent times have experienced a remarkable growth. Turkey is amongst 
the major countries Iran export to as shown in the Figure VIII. 
Figure VIII – Major Countries Iran Exports To
Source: Undersecretariat of Prime Ministry for Foreign Trade, 2009c: 3
The actual volume of trade which was 2.4 billion dollars in 2003, 2.8 billion 
dollars in 2004, 4.3 billion dollars in 2005, 6.6 billion in 2006, 8 billion dollars in 
2007, is now over 10 billion dollars as clear figured out in Table V (Undersecretariat 
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of Prime Ministry for Foreign Trade, 2009c: 4; Embassy of Republic of Turkey in 
Tehran, 2008b).
Table V – Foreign Trade of Turkey with Iran (Thousand dollars)
Year Export Import Volume Balance
2003 533.786 1.860.683 2.394.469 -1.326.897
2004 813.031 1.962.059 2.775.090 -1.149.028
2005 912.940 3.469.706 4.382.646 -2.556.766
2006 1.066.902 5.626.610 6.693.512 -4.559.708
2007 1.441.190 6.615.393 8.056.583 -5.174.203
2008 2.028.451 8.199.594 10.228.045 -6.171.143
Source: Undersecretariat of Prime Ministry for Foreign Trade, 2009c: 4
Since Iran is a natural resource rich country which possesses 10 percent of the 
world's oil reserves and is the world’s second-ranked country in term of amount of 
natural gas reserves, following the Russian Federation (BP, 2009: 6, 22), it is not 
astonishing that in volume of trade between Turkey and Iran the item which creates 
the largest impact for increasing volume is natural gas. Among the items Turkey 
imports from Iran, crude oil and natural gas compose a large share (90 percent of 
Iranian exports to Turkey) (Embassy of Republic of Turkey in Tehran, 2008b).
The origin of natural gas trade between Turkey and Iran is the Agreement on 
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Sales and Purchase of Natural Gas in 1995 – which came into force in 1996. This 
agreement stipulates at first 3 billion cubic meter of gas to be supplied for Turkey’s 
domestic use. By 2007, the amount has increased to 10 billion cubic meters (Ekinci, 
2009: 3). 
The Memorandum of Understanding which was signed in both July and 
November 2007, are the further document for improved energy relations between 
Iran and Turkey. Aside from bilateral economic relations, concerning international 
projects the most important ones on the agenda of economic relations of two 
countries are to transport the Iranian gas to Turkey and then Europe via Turkey. 
Besides, there have been ongoing negotiations for transportation of Iranian gas to 
Europe via Turkey, Turkmenistan gas to Turkey via Iran and development of 22, 23 
and 24 phases in Turkey's South Pars natural gas field. After deduction of Iranian 
share, some of the expected amount of 20 billion cubic meters of gas, produced from 
the South Pars field by Turkey will be used domestically in Turkey and the rest will 
feed the Nabucco Gas Pipeline Project (Ekinci, 2009: 4). Also signed memorandums 
envisage cooperation between the two countries in electricity field (Embassy of 
Republic of Turkey in Tehran, 2008b).
Increasing cooperation with Iran regarding energy enables Turkey to actualize 
its strategic aims. First of all, Turkey is willing to diversify its natural gas suppliers 
and strengthen energy security. In this sense, cooperation with Iran is desirable. 
Secondly, Iranian gas will bridge over the Nabucco Gas Pipeline Project. 
Cooperation with Iran will also form an alternative route for Turkmen and other 
Central Asian gas to reach the Western markets. In addition to these, since Turkey 
and Iran are neighbors, Turkey does not have to pay transit fee (which is paid to third 
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countries between the supplier and demanding countries) (Ekinci, 2009; 13) 21.
Meanwhile, Iran enjoys advantages of cooperation with Turkey. The Iranian 
economy highly depends on petroleum and gas revenues (Embassy of Republic of 
Turkey in Tehran, 2008a). Another client for its gas and a reliable way to deliver its 
gas to the world markets are basic positive aspects of Iran gaining from cooperation 
with Turkey. Besides, cooperation with Turkey would also enable Iran to break 
through isolation policies and to strengthen its foreign policy towards major Western 
countries; in this context the EU is the first choice coming into minds since the 
Nabucco Project enables Iran to actualize this aim. Potential to become a rival 
against Russia concerning delivery of the rich energy resources of the Caspian and 
Central Asia is the other gain Iran earns from cooperation.
3.2.2 Turkey, Iran and the USA
Turkey, a strategic ally of the USA throughout the years, has acted jointly 
with the USA with regards to almost every international issue (as long as these 
actions were within the framework of Turkish national interests). Memorandums, 
agreements and treaties on various issues has increased and also deepened the 
cooperation of these strategic allies. Regarding Iran, the aforementioned agreements 
(the Shared Vision and Structures Dialogue to advance the Turkish – American 
                    
21 On the other hand, energy relations with Iran are not smooth as it is expected. There are problematic 
issues regarding the “take or pay” condition and due to “take or pay” article in the agreement, Iran 
claims compensation from Turkey (İlbaş, 2009b), besides pressurizing inclusion of an article related 
to cut-off of the flow of gas due to any reason Iran considers as important in the agreement; whereas 
Turkey demand reduction in gas prices since its trade deficit has been increased significantly because 
of the gas trade. In addition to these, the agreement does not allow Turkey to re-export the gas it buys 
from Iran. This is amongst the articles Turkey tries to amend. Since the agreement will be in force till 
2023, these conditions become problematic and are against Turkey’s national interests (Ekinci, 2009: 
6).
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Strategic Partnership Agreement, et cetera) also pushes both countries to take part on 
the same side and cooperate. However, demand for energy proportionally increasing 
with the population and growth in the economy, ambition to become an important 
regional actor and to maintain good relations with neighbors, Turkey has started to 
take its own steps in the way that the USA, hegemonic power of the unipolar system, 
does not expect. Cooperation between Turkey and Iran does not fit into the plans of 
the USA regarding the Middle East, since Iranian – American relations22 are tense, 
currently due to uranium enrichment program of Iran. Basically, Iran’s nuclear 
program creates certain threat against American power. Since there is no perfect 
information about intentions of the Iranian government, there is mutual mistrust and 
a risk of a threat against the USA, hegemonic power, the USA dogmatizes that use of 
nuclear program out of civilian purposes to develop nuclear weapons by Iran, 
classified as an aggressive country, is a step for deterrence against the Western 
power. In this context, the USA tries to obstacle every possible opportunity, which 
Iran would enjoy the benefits from.
“Several US laws and Executive Orders extend sanctions to foreign 
companies that do business with Iran, as part of an effort to persuade foreign firms to 
choose between the Iranian market and the much larger US market. A formal US 
effort to curb international energy investment in Iran began in 1996 with the Iran 
Sanctions Act (ISA)” (Pamir, 2009; 39). The US government prohibits companies or 
corporations to invest more than 20 million dollars in Iranian oil and gas sector and 
in such a case this decision enables the US government to put embargo on that 
corporation or company (Çekirge, 2007). This decision does not only concern 
American entrepreneurs; but also concern international companies and other national 
                    
22 Currently, there have been no diplomatic relations between Iran and the US.
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companies as well. Thus amount of investments of the Turkish Petroleum 
Corporation (in Turkish: Türkiye Petrolleri Anonim Ortaklığı – TPAO) in South Pars 
field has been restricted to 20 million dollars23. This limits Turkey’s actions and 
benefits both Iran and Turkey would gain. As previously mentioned, due to 
sanctions, Iran suffers undeveloped and unimproved technology and needs large 
amounts of sound investments to improve its production capacity. However none of 
the companies choose to oppose the USA and suffer embargo.
The memorandums, which were mentioned as a positive step toward Iranian –
Turkish cooperation in energy, have not been put into force yet (Ekinci, 2009; 4, 5). 
Although Turkish and Iranian governments signed the almost same memorandum 
(which foresees both governments to sign the agreement [which is the next step, 
guaranteeing the articles of the memorandum] in a – year – time after the day 
memorandum was signed) twice (in July and November 2007); yet due to strong 
opposition of the USA they haven’t been turned into an agreement.
Regarding Nabucco Gas Pipeline Project, involvement of Iranian gas in the 
project is strictly opposed by the USA. The American side claims that the project is 
feasible enough with Azerbaijani and Turkmen gas which has to be delivered via 
Turkey without crossing the Iranian territory. An example for a similar case would 
be the BTC. In the first proposal for a pipeline connecting Caspian oil to Western 
markets via Turkey, Azerbaijan – Iran – Turkey was involved as another alternative 
to Georgia. Although Azerbaijan – Iran – Turkey route was 100 kilometers shorter 
than the route going through Georgia, the Iran option was strictly opposed by the 
other Western partners of the project. In addition to these despite the fact that Iranian 
                    
23 The expected cost of the investment of Turkish Petroleum Corporation in the South Pars field is 12 
million dollars (Ekinci, 2009;11).
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government declared its interest in the BTC project and its willingness to be a partner 
of the consortium, Iran option was again opposed. (Şen, 2009; 71, 75, 134).
On the other hand, Turkish – Iranian relations can also serve for an aim of re-
maintenance of the balance of power in the region when Russia and China, a country 
which has made its voice heard much more than ever in international arena in the last 
decade, are considered. High tension between Iran and the USA causes Iran and 
Russia, which is another dominant actor in the region aiming to maintain its 
influence again as it had in USSR era; to become closer regarding the policies for the 
Caspian. Thus close Turkish – Iranian relations, in the meantime increasing potential 
of Iran for energy routes via Turkey; in other word in pipeline politics, would put 
Iran and Russia on opposite side and make them rivals in a game over the Caspian 
energy sources.
3.3 Turkey – Iraq – the USA Triangle
Turkey and the US have been cooperating in the issues for Iraq, as in several 
issues related to the Middle East, Caspian and Europe. Maintenance of stability and 
security; settlement of democracy, contribution of economic development of Iraq are 
amongst the issues with regards to post – war Iraq. In the Shared Vision and 
Structured Dialogue to Advance the Turkish – American Strategic Partnership 
Document, it is mentioned that Turkey and the USA have joint actions for all issues 
of common concern in the Middle East, including promoting peace and stability in 
the broader Middle East through democracy; fostering stability and prosperity in a 
unified Iraq (Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006: 3). Besides, 
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among EPC Action Items 2008 – 2009, continuation of  work together on 
transportation of Iraqi natural gas to Turkey and European markets and beyond and 
establishment of bilateral energy working groups on Iraqi gas and petroleum issues 
[in process] (in addition to Caspian gas), and exploration of opportunities to foster 
cooperation between the relevant Turkish and U.S. institutions on research, 
implementation, research and development activities for production, transportation, 
distribution and utilization of environmentally friendly energy resources, including 
hydrogen energy were highlighted (Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
2009e: 2).
In addition to political cooperation, contribution to economic development in 
Iraq is also a major field for cooperation. The Turkish and US companies have been 
working in a number of joint construction projects all over the world. Turkish 
companies have been working under contracts with their US counterparts to build 
Iraq (and Afghanistan) (The Undersecretariat of the Prime Ministry for Foreign 
Trade, 2008).
On the other hand, there have been various arguments, claiming that the US 
policies in Iraq have negatively affected the Turkish interests in the region. Thus in 
this section, the US – Turkish energy relations are touched upon with an aim of 
finding an answer of mainly negative arguments which are opposing US – Turkish
cooperation in Iraq, following a brief analysis of Iraqi – Turkish economic and 
energy relations in the last two decades.
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3.3.1 Turkey and Iraq in Pre – War and Post – War Era
In pre – Gulf War period, Turkey’s volume of trade with Iraq was 
approximately 5.5 billion US dollars. However by the 1990s, due to United Nations 
(UN) sanctions – which required ban of exports to Iraq and imports from Iraq (except 
food and medicine), trade between Turkey and Iraq perished24 (Undersecretariat of 
Prime Ministry for Foreign Trade, 2009b: 3). In late 90s and early 2000s, with an 
increasing volume of trade, Turkey and Iraq started to cover the expenses of 
economic loss which were caused by the UN sanctions. In this era, trade relations 
between Turkey and Iraq relied on barter trade of goods and commodities in return of 
crude oil (Undersecretariat of Prime Ministry for Foreign Trade, 2009b: 3). 
The Iraq – Turkey (Kirkuk – Ceyhan) Crude Oil Pipeline transports the oil 
produced in Kirkuk to the Ceyhan. The pipeline system with an annual transportation 
capacity of 35 Million tons was constructed in 1976 (Petroleum Pipeline 
Corporation, 2010b). The capacity of the pipeline was expanded twice throughout the 
years. Due to these expansions, the annual capacity reached 71 billion tons by the 
end of 1987. “The operation of the pipeline system was suspended on August 1990, 
in conjunction with the embargo imposed on Iraq by the UN. The suspension was 
ceased under the agreement of UN and Iraq on May 1996 and limited oil export has 
been allowed since then. Crude oil loading activities were initiated on December 16, 
1996 under the UN Resolution” (Petroleum Corporation, 2010b).
                    
24 The total amount of economic loss Turkey due to UN sanctions was 120 billion US dollars) 
(Undersecretariat of Prime Ministry for Foreign Trade, 2009b, 3).
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Figure IX – Crude Oil Transportation by Year 25
Source: Petroleum Pipeline Corporation, 2010
“The Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline was mainly empty from 2003, after the USA
overthrow of Saddam Hussein, until late 2007, and it has since been the target of 
disruptive attacks (most recently last November), besides suffering general disrepair 
as a result of the prewar UN sanctions and subsequent collateral damage” 
(EnerjiEnergy, March 28, 2010b). As clear from the Figure IX, the main supplier of
crude oil to Turkey is Iraq, whereas the Ceyhan Port is a major outlet for Iraqi oil 
exports and deactivation of the pipeline due to Iraq war severely affected both 
Turkey and Iraq. “On March 8, 2004, Iraq issued a tender for Kirkuk oils via the 
                    
25 The reason of less oil in the Iraq – Turkey Crude Oil Pipeline in the year of 1996, was that on one of 
the parallel pipelines, pumps were dismantled and taken to Basra. In order to operationalize the 
pipeline, an investment, costing 12 million US dollars was made (Şen, 2009, 67).
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Turkish port of Ceyhan, the first such sale from Iraq's northern oil fields in a year” 
(Devlet, 2004; 72). However since 2008, the oil flow is promising.
The other element negatively affecting Turkey’s interests in Iraq is 
destruction of pipelines. Especially starting from the year of 2003, the Iraq – Turkey 
Crude Oil Pipeline was one of the targets of terrorists and insurgents. There have 
been numerous bomb attacks. The recent one happened in May 2010, and disrupted 
Iraqi crude oil export to Turkey (EnerjiEnergy Portal, May 17, 2010).
On the other hand, relations of Turkey with Iraq are not only bounded by only 
energy issues; yet composing a significantly large context. Turkey considers its 
relations with Iraq as a multi-dimensional integrated whole. Energy, economy and 
reconstruction are the most important dimensions of this whole (Republic of Turkey, 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2009e). Thus Turkey and Iraq aim to accomplish a 
strategic relationship in a wide range of issues. According to Joint Political 
Declarations on the establishment of the High Level Strategic Cooperation Council 
between Governments of the Republic of Turkey and the Republic of Iraq of 2008, 
this cooperation is composed of political, economic, energy, water, cultural, security 
and military fields. According to the Joint Declaration, the basic principles in 
economic and energy related spheres are; “concluding strategic economic 
cooperation and integration agreements between the two countries by the end of 
2008; cooperating in reconstruction work in Iraq; supporting cooperation in the field 
of transport infrastructure of Iraq with the aim of integrating Iraq with Europe 
through Turkey; cooperating in the field of energy by establishing partnerships 
between Turkish and Iraqi companies as well as transporting Iraqi natural resources 
to the world markets through most viable export routes, in this context upgrading and 
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expanding the existing capacity of Kirkuk - Yumurtalık oil pipeline; and building a 
pipeline network to transport natural gas from Iraq to international markets via 
Turkey (Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, July 10, 2008; 2-3). In 
order to promote economic and energy relations, Meeting of Ministers of Foreign 
affairs of the Neighbor Countries of the initiative entitled “International Compact 
with Iraq” was held in Turkey in November 2007, and Turkish representatives took 
an active role for the Energy Study Group26 (Embassy of the Republic of Turkey in 
Bagdad, 2009).
Turkey is the main provider for Iraq’s refined oil product needs. In 2005, 50% 
of Iraq’s and 90% of northern Iraq’s refined oil products were supplied through 
Turkey. Total oil products, imported by Iraq through Turkish companies between 
January 2003 and January 2007, is over 10 million tons (Republic of Turkey, 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2009f).
3.3.2 Post War Era and US Influence on Oil Industry in Iraq
“Energy plays a crucial role in the survival and well – being of the USA and 
virtually all other countries, both developing and developed” (Kalicki and Goldwyn, 
2005; xxi). The USA, due to its developed and technologically improved economy is 
the leading country in oil imports in the world. Imported oil accounts for about two-
thirds of US consumption (CIA, 2010). Thus it is not surprising that the USA was in 
need of controlling the Middle East which is “said to be an isle sitting over a lake of 
oil” (Kumaş, 2009; 29). “In fact, the best way to see what’s happening today in Iraq 
                    
26 Other meetings of the Energy Study Group were held in two successive years, both 2007 and 2008 
again in Turkey.
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[mentioning the US intervention] and elsewhere is through a geopolitical prism. 
American leaders have embarked on the classical geopolitical project of assuring 
U.S. dominance of the most important resource areas, understood as the sources of 
power and wealth” (Klare, 2003). The USA had an aim to promote to dominance in 
the Persian Gulf and to serve as a springboard for further conquests and assertion of 
power in the region by the war against Iraq (Klare, 2003).
Aside from explaining the reasons of the war, the influence and effects of the 
USA on energy politics would much more appropriate to deal with in the context of 
the thesis. In the aftermath of shooting war, a new era started for Iraqi people. They, 
who were suffering of unfair policies of a dictator, were introduced to democracy, 
and they were expected to govern their own country according to necessities of 
democracy. As in every field, institutionalization and adopting necessary legislations 
became crucial. Despite its necessity, Iraqi government could not adopt a law for the 
oil industry – which (along with its economic wealth) admittedly seems to be the 
reason of most of most of the incidents.
Iraq does not have a sound legislation for extraction, trade and development 
of oil and natural gas fields. The proposed oil law of 2007 requires a shift of Iraq’s 
massive reserves from public to private hands. “It could see private companies 
develop and profit from Iraq’s oil for 15-30 year periods with virtually no possibility 
for the Iraqi state to renegotiate contractual terms and conditions” (Niqash, April 23, 
2007). Rights to control of development, extraction, profits of the oil industry -
which the state is able to claim - the control of oil flow would be passed to exclusive 
control of private companies. “Article 41 of the law stipulates that any disputes 
between foreign companies and Iraqi authorities which cannot be resolved through 
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negotiation, will be resolved ‘through arbitration or the competent authority’ " 
(Niqash, April 23, 2007). In practice this means that, the Iraqi government, wishing 
to reverse terms, would not be able to use its own judicial system. Besides, according 
to news agencies’ sources, it was rumored that “Prime Minister Nouri Al Maliki had 
revealed he feared being ousted by the US administration if he did not secure the 
passing of an oil law by the end of June” (Niqash, April 23, 2007).
In addition to these, as the proposed law has several setbacks which are 
against Iraqi national interests, the Kurdish Regional Government tries to gain 
autonomy not only for domestic regional polities; but also for use and extraction of 
energy sources – which seriously challenges authority of the Iraqi government. As 
debates for proposed oil law were continuing; in August 2007, the Kurdish Regional 
Government adopted a law regarding the oil and gas industry in the region. “The law 
also decrees the establishment of a number of companies for exploration and 
production and marketing of oil, and the conclusion of contracts with foreign 
companies. All these companies are subject to the Ministry of Natural Resources of 
the region” (Niqash, September 2007). On the other hand, the federal government of 
the Republic of Iraq declared that they did not recognize contracts between the 
region and foreign companies that were signed without the approval of the Ministry 
of Oil of the Republic. (Niqash, September 27, 2007).
As evident from the explanations about the legislations for oil and gas above, 
Iraq has been suffering from lack of sound policies and implementation which would 
settle the oil and gas industries. The proposed oil law, which has not been adopted 
yet, was introduced to the Iraqi parliament – supposedly – under the pressure of the 
US government. This proposed oil law enables foreign companies to make profit for 
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15 to 30 years by preventing any interventions from the Iraqi government. According 
to the web – site of the Ministry of Oil of Iraq (2010), there are 5 American oil 
companies, which are the leading transnational oil companies (Chevron, 
ConocoPhillips, ExxonMobil, Motor Oil and Valero) amongst the companies which 
take place in exportation process of Iraqi crude oil. In addition to these American oil 
companies, there are other big transnational oil companies27 involved in crude oil 
export process. When these are analyzed, it will be obvious that the proposed oil law 
had an aim to favor these companies, whereas, Turkish Petroleum Refineries 
Corporation (in Turkish: Türkiye Petrol Rafinerileri Anonim Şirketi – TÜPRAŞ) as a 
comparably small oil company, which does not have any global role in oil industry 
like the previously listed companies, would severely be affected from the law. 
Therefore ‘Turkey would not gain a profitable share from the oil cake of Iraq’ will be 
an outcome resulting from this analysis. 
“Turkey [and Russia] associate Iraq not with the war against terrorism; but 
with destabilizing chaos that has damaged their national interests – [Turkey’s more 
profoundly], given its Iraqi oil contracts” (Hill and Taşınar, 2006; 86). Turkey, since 
the start of the war, was not actively involved in Iraqi oil industry. “Relations [with 
the USA] have particularly deteriorated after March 1, 2003 parliamentary decision 
not to permit the deployment of US troops to Iraq via Turkish territory … The period 
between March 1, 2003 and November 5, 2007 marked the lowest point in relations 
since the US arms embargo 1975 – 78, and the reservoirs of trust on both sides have 
been greatly depleted” (Öniş and Yılmaz, 2009; 12 – 13). Deterioration was not only 
                    
27 BP Oil and Shell from the United Kingdom, Total from France, ENI and ERG from Italy, China 
National, Nippon UNIPEC  and Sinochem from China, Cepsa and Repsol from Spain, Hindustan and 
Indian Oil from India, Lukoil from Russia, SAMIR from Morocco, Jordan PET.CO from Jordan, SK 
Energy from South Korea and Koch from Greece are the other companies involved in Iraqi crude oil 
export (Ministry of Oil of the Republic of Iraq, 2010).
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in diplomatic relations; yet it can be bought forward that energy role of Turkey in 
Iraq was affected due to tense relations with the USA in that period.
Although Turkish Petroleum Corporation was not able to have sound energy 
ties with Iraq (The corporation has been continuing its contracts with the Ministry of 
Oil of Iraq since 1994, for exploration and production opportunities in Iraq, yet there 
have not been concrete steps regarding these activities) (Turkish Petroleum 
Corporation, 2008), Turkey has been strengthening its position in Iraqi oil industry, 
especially in the aftermath of declarations regarding withdrawal of US troops from 
Iraq by 2011. Recently Turkish Petroleum Corporation obtained the bid for oil 
reserves in Qut in the context of consortium lead by Russian Gazprom which has a 
share of 40 percent, whereas Turkish Petroleum Corporation has 10 percent and in 
the meantime, the Minister of Oil, Hussain Sheristani, stated that along with 
achievement of Turkish Petroleum Corporation in the bid for oil reserves in Qut, Iraq 
would be willing to develop new routes with Turkey for oil fields in Kirkuk after 
developing the infrastructure (EnerjiEnergy, December 13, 2009; EnerjiEnergy, 
December 14, 2009). Another promising development was that Iraq, which aims to 
deliver its gas via Turkey to Europe, signed a Memorandum of Understanding with 
the EU for a strategic partnership in January (EnerjiEnergy, January 19, 2010). This 
definitely promotes Turkey’s national interests in the region and strengthens its 
energy card towards the EU in the context of the Nabucco Gas Pipeline Project. In 
addition to these, Turkish Petroleum Corporation has been in talks with the Iraqi 
South Oil Company to drill 45 oil wells at the Rumaila field for $318 million 
(EnerjiEnergy, March 3, 2010). Regarding renewal of the existing agreements, Iraq 
and Turkey were trying to reach a consensus on two issues, the term of the 
agreement and the price. Turkey strengthened its energy ties with Iraq by renewing a 
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contract, covering 15 – 20 years to import Iraqi oil to the Turkish Mediterranean Sea 
port of Ceyhan, in March 2010 (EnerjiEnergy Portal, March 28, 2010a; EnerjiEnergy 
Portal, March 28, 2010b). One of the recent developments is that Turkish Petroleum 
Corporation, with its Chinese business partner CNOOCI, signed an agreement to 
develop 3 oil fields in Maysan which is located in the south of Baghdad. Total 
capacity of reserves in these 3 fields is 8 billion barrels whereas the production 
capacity is 2 billion barrels. It is expected that in six year time, daily production will 
reach 450 thousand barrels in the field which will be managed for 20 years 
(EnerjiEnergy, May 18, 2010).
These recent developments create a pursuit for an answer of a question which 
is “why has Turkey become so active in the oil industry of Iraq, despite the fact that 
it was not during the Iraq War?” During the Iraq war, as the USA was trying to fight 
against terrorists, insurgents and to maintain security, it was also trying to strengthen 
its dominance regarding policies of the country, thus the region. Many politicians 
and scholars claimed that the Iraq war did not bring stability and peace; yet it was all 
about passion of the USA on energy, and the war buried Iraqi people in the heart of 
clashes; conversely nowadays there have been ongoing discussion that after 
withdrawal of the US troops from Iraq, the country will go deep into a chaos, since it 
has not been stabilized yet, throughout the 7 years. Thus Iraq will be (and even now 
is) in desperate need in restructuring and reconstruction. Such a country would 
definitely be an exact place for policies, seeking for easy opportunities to get, bearing 
in mind that Russia and China stand as significant rivals of the USA. China, as a 
growing economy, has increasing energy needs, whereas Russia would like to 
dominate the Middle Eastern energy policies, in addition Caucasian and Caspian. 
These countries have the potential to challenge plans and dominance of the US 
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regarding the Middle East. In this sense, Turkey becomes an important mediator, to 
prevent threat of possible Russian or Chinese dominance in the region to some 
extend in the aftermath of the US withdrawal. Throughout the US view, instead of 
having a strong Russia and/or China in Iraq and shaping energy politics, partnership 
of Turkey in the consortiums where Russia and/or China are involved in would 
soften their dominance.
In addition to these, if the situation is analyzed through a different 
perspective, a different outcome would appear. According to some political activists, 
like Noam Chomsky, although President Barack Obama admitted that the Iraq 
invasion was “merely a mistake or strategic blunder”, and the Obama government 
declared that they would withdraw American forces from Iran by 2011; in fact, the 
USA has not given up its desire to control the Middle East oil reserves, since the 
Middle Eastern oil reserves are considered to be “a stupendous source of strategic 
power” and “one of the greatest material prizes in world history” (La Progressive, 
November 3, 2009; Köni, November 8, 2009). According to this point of view, it can 
also be stated that Turkey, no matter what the US intentions concerning the Middle 
Eastern oil are, Turkey would be a mediator to soften supposed ambition of the 
current Obama government, which is blamed for pursuing policies of the Bush era in 
the Middle East, to some extend and prevent public opinion to have a negative shift 
against the current US government.
3.4 Strategic Partnership for Energy?
This chapter gives a detailed analysis of Turkish – American energy relations 
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focusing on three countries; Azerbaijan (mainly referred as Caspian), Iran and Iraq. 
Although Turkey and the USA cooperate in a wide range of issues such maintenance 
of security, prevention of terrorism and fundamentalism, promotion of peace and 
increasing economic cooperation, in energy sector the same development has not 
been observed, since these two countries do not implement direct energy policies and 
do not have direct energy trade between each other; yet it can be stated that influence 
and support of the US government regarding energy issues are mainly encountered. 
Since assertions of neoliberalism; such as cooperation and common interests 
in economic affairs stand weak in harmony to explain energy relations between 
Turkey and the USA, neorealism is chosen to explain attitude of the USA regarding 
energy issues and Turkey’s action according to the US influence. When energy is 
considered as a tool for power and wealth, it becomes significant for states’ pursuit 
of survival. Thus rationality in states’ actions becomes very important. 
Caspian region is one of the regions in which Turkey’s active role in energy 
sector has been supported by the USA. The aforementioned support results from 
rationality of the USA. By supporting Turkey, the USA prevents Russia to become a 
monopoly again and increases its access to the region by an ally; Turkey. Basically 
cooperation with Turkey in the region is a basic tool to prevent a possible rising 
power (Russia) in the Caspian after the Cold War era and to increase relative gains 
regarding rich energy resources of the region. The BTC Crude Oil Pipeline is an 
evident example for supporting the argument that the USA favored this pipeline, 
because geostrategic location of Turkey motivated the US government to back BTC 
instead of its rivals which were more desired by the major transnational energy 
companies. In this sense, from the first assumption of neorealism, it becomes obvious 
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that the major actors in the world system are sovereign states which are Turkey and 
the USA, and these actors accomplish interactions; there are no other units (as 
neoliberalism assumes) in the system affecting their interactions. Neither status of 
transnational companies nor their profits are important, when national interests are 
taken into consideration. In the meantime, the Nabucco Natural Gas Pipeline Project 
is a contemporary case in which the USA is willing to use Turkey’s geostrategic 
importance again. By both projects, the USA tries to increase its relative gains in the 
region, whereas Turkey seeks for the same aim and increase its relative gains 
compared to any other alternate countries in major projects connecting the Caspian to 
the West and also benefiting from energy sources for its own domestic energy needs. 
Regarding the Caspian, it is observed that there is cooperation for common aims; yet 
it is limited. Although Armenian – Turkish normalization talks enrich outcomes of 
possible gains of the USA, from increasing energy routes in the Caspian, it is 
observed that the outcome of the talks will not be fruitful regarding energy; yet 
Turkey has faced setbacks from the Azerbaijani side. Normalization talks have been 
suspended and signed protocols have not been ratified yet. Neither Armenia, nor 
Turkey, (nor Azerbaijan) can evaluate possible fruitful economic outcomes resulting 
especially from cooperation for energy transportation in the region, since historical 
and political problems affecting their national security and sovereignty outweigh 
more than cooperation.
Iran is a threat against the USA, the hegemonic power of the world system 
challenging its status quo. Although cooperation with Iran enables Turkey to enjoy 
several advantages such as diversifying its imported energy, meeting its energy 
demands by rich Iranian sources (Unlike neorealism, according to neoliberalism, 
economic linkage and common economic aims are basically enough to have 
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cooperation. On the other hand cooperation of Turkey with Iran cannot be labeled as 
bandwagoning – which means alliance with the aggressor according to neorealism); 
the scenario alters when the USA steps into the scene. First of all, there is imperfect 
information about the intention of the Iranian government about its nuclear program 
and nuclear proliferation. Any attempt providing either political or economic benefit 
to Iran is a challenge against the US security. Thus increasing cooperation between 
these two countries encounters US opposition. From the Turkish perspective, it is 
evident that Turkish – Iranian relations are mostly influenced by the USA. 
Agreements signed by Turkey and Iran have not been ratified and Turkey cannot 
invest in Iranian energy sector more than the quota the US government allows. 
Turkey cannot negotiate with the USA about the level of its cooperation with Iran or 
cannot act against the US directions. Basically the USA pressurizes Turkey either 
diplomatically or politically and dominates the scope of Turkish – Iranian energy 
relations. These are specific examples for limitation of cooperation due to division of 
capabilities and possible gains. The USA is not willing to let Iran have economic 
benefits from trade of energy and increase its share in the energy sector, thus its 
power, influence and capabilities in the Middle East, and the USA does not want a 
threat challenging its national security and its dominating role in the Middle East; 
whereas Turkey cannot have the venture to act against the hegemonic power, so 
cooperation becomes hard to achieve due to dominance of the USA.
The USA considers Turkey as a strategic ally to establish strong bonds with 
the Muslim world. However, according to the research done for this thesis, this 
strategic alliance has not been observed regarding the Iraqi case. The pursuit of the 
USA for various alternatives other than Turkey to increase its gains and strengthen 
its position regarding energy created setbacks for Turkey. Cuts and decrease in the 
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flow in Iraq – Turkey Crude Oil Pipeline are evident examples favoring this 
argument. The post- war era does not create a positive atmosphere for Turkey to be 
active in the Iraqi oil sector. It has been observed that the USA favors Turkey’s 
activeness as long as this activeness coincides with American interests, thus it can be 
said that the USA permits Turkey ‘limited freedom’ in issues regarding energy – the 
priority is American gains. On the other hand there have been some promising 
developments which favor Turkey’s position in Iraqi energy sector in the last years 
after declaration about withdrawal of the US troops from Iraq. However the proposed 
Iraqi oil law which was introduced under the influence of the US government shows 
that it is proposed to favor presence of the USA and American interests, and limits 
Turkey’s competitiveness in Iraqi oil sector (it is needless to say that lack of well-
developed and competitive energy industry and well –organized energy companies is 
another contributing factor limiting Turkey’s competitiveness).
To conclude, energy relations of Turkey and the USA mainly rely on the US
influence and do not favor Turkey if the USA evaluates policies and Turkey’s 
position against its interests. There is not negotiation or compromise between Turkey 
and the US for creating a common ground (however, negotiation was another 
assertion of neoliberalism yielding cooperation); instead, dominance of the US in 
every case has been observed. The US basically tries to maintain its status quo, 
prevent any challenge from any threat against its power. By international pipeline 
projects in the Caspian, the US tries to increase its relative gains compared to Russia, 
and by dominating Turkish – Iranian energy relations, it still increases its relative 
gains compared to Iran and keeps its status quo by preventing the threat to gain 
power; and in the Iraqi case it seeks for maximizing its own interests. Meanwhile 
Turkey, as a rational state, tries to maximize its national interests by integrating 
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international projects and seeks for support of the US for other possible pipeline 
projects, which increase its geostrategic importance and yield possible future gains. 
In the philosophy of neorealism, major expectation drawn from outcomes of energy 
affairs is little cooperation. Energy policies of Turkey and relations with the US are 
set into neorealist approach and expectations are drawn accordingly.
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CHAPTER IV
THE EUROPEAN UNION AND TURKEY
Turkey stands as one of the important transit routes for pipeline based 
projects; since due to dependency of the EU on Russian energy; the EU tries to find 
feasible alternative transit routes. Turkey, due to its geopolitical position and 
proximity to major world energy exporter countries, aims to become the most 
feasible and desired route of the EU for energy transit not only from Russia; but from 
all other sources of gas and oil. Starting from declaration of the official candidacy of 
Turkey, accession process yields cooperation especially in energy relations and the 
acquis becomes the pushing pressure. Besides, pipelines passing through Turkey 
strengthen Turkey’s position to turn into an energy hub. Along with the aim of 
becoming an energy hub, Turkey is passionate to turn its energy capacity into an 
artery supplying large amounts of oil and gas to the EU. Since energy is considered 
as one of the most important issues for the EU; and Turkey is a candidate country for 
membership to the Union, ‘will its passion on energy pave its way for accession into 
the EU?’ is the main question which an answer is searched about. This chapter uses 
neoliberalism in order to answer the question.
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4.1 Benefits of implementation of the acquis on energy
The acquis basically refers to the total body of the European Union (EU) law 
accumulated so far. The EU acquis has currently been split up into 33 chapters (it 
was composed of 31 chapters for the fifth enlargement process of the EU) for 
candidate countries (Croatia and Turkey) for easier negotiation in accession process. 
“The accession process consists of holding explanatory and bilateral screening 
meetings on the harmonization of the [Turkish] legislation to the acquis [in 33 
chapters and of negotiating these chapters]” (Republic of Turkey - Secretariat 
General for EU Affairs, 2008b: 2). “Implementing the acquis requires not only 
adequate legislation but also well functioning institutions” (Austrian Energy Agency, 
2010) such as regulatory or control bodies and authorities. In order for the EU to 
reach secure, sustainable and reliable goals and objectives in every field of its 
policies, cooperation with countries - both recently joining and candidate - becomes 
very crucial. In this context, implementation of the acquis plays a vital role and 
enables the EU to act on common platform for its policies with member and 
candidate countries.
As for every sector and issue related with the EU, the EU acquis on energy 
embodies huge importance and covers key elements of both primary and secondary 
legislation in the topics of the EU energy policies. “Community energy policy 
objectives include the improvement of competitiveness, security of energy supplies 
and the protection of the environment. The energy acquis consists of rules and 
policies, notably regarding competition and State aid, the internal energy market, 
energy efficiency and nuclear energy” (European Commission, 2009). In order to 
maintain efficiency and consistency in energy sector, the EU must create 
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partnerships and cooperate to guarantee security of its energy supplies, especially 
with candidate countries. Thus not only countries, from which the EU imports its 
energy; but also countries, which have turned into energy corridors, stand as very 
important elements. The EU acquis on energy requires candidate countries to;
i) decide on an overall energy policy with clear timetables for restructuring the 
sector;
ii) prepare for the internal energy market (the Gas and Electricity directives; the 
Directive on electricity produced from renewable energy sources); 
iii) improve energy networks in order to create a real European market; 
iv) prepare for crisis situations, particularly through the constitution of 90 days of 
oil stocks; 
v) address the social, regional and environmental consequences of the 
restructuring of mines; 
vi) waste less energy and increase the use of renewable energies such as wind, 
hydro, solar and biomass in their energy balance; 
vii) improve the safety of nuclear power plants in order to ensure that electricity is 
produced according to a high level of nuclear safety;
viii) ensure that nuclear waste is handled in a responsible manner; and prepare for 
the implementation of Euratom Safeguards on nuclear materials.28
Turkey, as one of the candidate countries for the EU and energy corridor 
whose importance and potential value have been increasing, is recognized by the EU 
as a secure and independent (of Russia) route for EU energy supplies (Tekin and 
Williams, 2009a: 352). Besides Turkey’s strategic proximity to energy exporter 
countries, its importance to the EU increases the necessity of common or similar 
policies between the EU and Turkey. Thus implementation of the EU acquis on 
energy in Turkey becomes very important. In addition to the importance of the EU 
acquis for common policies, there are evident benefits Turkey gains within the 
context of rules and principles of the acquis. For instance; opening up of the 
electricity and gas markets, promotion of renewable energy sources, crisis 
                    
28 European Commission, 2004.
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management and oil stock security obligations are among the issues which Turkey 
improves its potential on.
According to Accession Partnership Program of 2008 of the Council for 
Turkey in Chapter 15 (which touches upon energy issues) in short term, Turkey 
should;
i) Continue alignment with, and implementation of, the acquis on the 
internal gas and electricity market and on cross-border exchanges in 
electricity, also with a view to possible membership of the Energy 
community Treaty. Ensure the implementation of fair and non-
discriminatory rules for the transmission of gas;
ii) Continue to develop the capacities of the different regulatory 
authorities and ensure their independence;
iii) Strengthen administrative capacity and continue alignment in the 
energy efficiency field, promote high – efficiency cogeneration, and 
develop renewable energy in transport, electricity and heating/cooling, 
including the setting of appropriate and ambitious targets and 
incentives;
iv) Accede to the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel 
Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management for 
energy issues.
In the medium term, Turkey should;
i) Ensure the establishment of a competitive internal energy market, in 
compliance with the electricity and gas directives. Further strengthen 
administrative and regulatory structures needed for a functional and 
competitive energy market;
ii) Adopt a nuclear law which ensures a high level of nuclear safety in 
line with the EU standards.29
The energy sector in Turkey was one of the most important sectors which was 
considered as an issue of national sovereignty and was dominated by state - owned 
companies. “A privatization programme was nevertheless devised with a view to 
privatizing areas such as coal, oil, electricity and gas” (European Commission, 
2009). With current developments, Turkey has allowed foreign investment to be 
                    
29 Republic of Turkey – Secretariat General for EU Affairs, 2008a.
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made in energy sector in order to supply energy for increasing demand - which is 
actually the aspect the European strategy gives importance to along with 
approximation of adopted laws in this sector. 
The European Commission has been publishing annual reports on Turkey’s 
energy policy, developments and implications since the year of officially –
announced candidacy (1999). “The 1999 Report emphasized that the objectives of 
Turkish energy policy were largely in line with those of the EU. They were 
concerned with security and diversification of sources of supply, market principles, 
environmental standards and improving efficiency. The amendment of the 
Constitution, paving the way for privatization, and international arbitration 
procedures were important steps forward in this connection” (European Commission, 
2009). The 2000 Report noted that the acquis in the field of energy had been limited 
(European Commission, 2009). A year later, in the 2001 Report, the Commission 
mentioned the importance of adoptions of two new laws regarding electricity and 
gas. Both the 2002 Report and the 2003 Report emphasized that Turkey had made 
significant progress in further aligning its legislation with the acquis in this area, 
particularly in the internal energy market (European Commission, 2009). Besides, in 
the 2003 Report it is mentioned that Turkey had some achievements in energy 
efficiency and renewables. The 2004 Report noted deficiencies and necessary 
progress of Turkish energy policy and the 2005 Report noted the continuation of 
efforts to align Turkey's energy laws along with a reasonable and ambitious timetable 
needed for energy efficiency and renewables (European Commission, 2009). This 
report is the first report especially touching upon nuclear energy. As in the 2004 
Report, the 2006 Report noted the importance of progress and in the 2007 Report, 
especially renewable energy and the independence and capacity of the regulatory 
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authorities were touched upon (European Commission, 2009). The last report of 
2008 puts forth that Turkey has not accomplished significant progress in 
implementation of the acquis. Regarding security of supply, internal energy market 
and energy efficiency, limited progress was made. State aid was among the ones 
where no progress was attained. Competition, transparent and cost-based pricing 
were not achieved (European Commission, 2008: 56-58). 
According to these reports, it becomes evident that continuous efforts have to 
be made to ensure that the sector was compatible with the EU acquis and also the 
internal energy market of the EU. 
4.1.1 Electricity
In European case, before liberalization of electricity markets, the electricity 
supply security in a given geographical area was usually ensured by a single, 
vertically integrated enterprise often publicly owned. In the present liberalized 
structure, investments are made by market decisions in a competitive framework but 
transmission investments are controlled by regulatory action or incentives. For 
electricity utilities, the advent of competitive pressure and falling prices have 
impacted significantly on financial performance.
In Turkey, according to data of Energy Market Regulation Authority –
EMRA (2008: 19), since 1984, the share of the private sector (15%) in electricity 
production was relatively negligible, compared to share of production by state –
owned companies (85%). However since the beginning of the 1990s, with tailor –
made modeling for the Turkish electricity sector, share of state-owned companies in 
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electricity production has been decreased. “Turkey has improved the efficiency of its 
electricity market while increasing private sector participation in power distribution 
and generation” (World Bank, 2010), The Electricity Market Law (Law 4628), which 
was adopted in 2001 within the context of the EU acquis, had an aim to liberalize the 
electricity market along with maintaining efficiency in production and avoiding 
technical and other possible problems in production process, to diversify the costs of 
electricity production among state – owned and private companies, to achieve 
decrease in losses and leaks in production, and - due to competition – to have low 
prices (EMRA, 2001: 1). The Commission labels this law (along with the law of gas 
adopted in 2002 – which is discussed in the following part) as a milestone for energy 
issues, since “this law concerned in particular the definition of the new structure of 
the sectors and the status of the players in sector” (European Commission, 2009).
Along with advantages of the law of 2001, there have been inconsistencies of 
the law. Turkish legislation has not been completely aligned with the EU acquis in 
this field. There has been no progress with regards to security of supply. Inefficiency 
and lack of mature structures of state – owned, private companies and the market 
have made financing of the electricity production difficult. In production and 
distribution groups (despite existence of several actors, such as state- owned 
companies, private companies, auto - producer groups and licenses) the structure is 
vertically integrated. This is a proof of lack of mature structure of the liberalized 
market (Onel, n.d.). 
On the other hand, Turkey has made progress in aligning with the acquis and 
in its preparations for the internal energy market through the adoption of two major 
framework laws for the electricity and gas sectors concerning in particular 
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restructuring and the players in the sectors. “Following the adoption of the 2002 
Electricity Market Law, around 20% of the electricity market was opened up in 2002. 
The aim is to complete the opening up of the market by 2011. Five new 
implementing regulations have been adopted since the last report. The threshold for 
eligible consumers has moreover been reduced to 3 GWh” (European Commission, 
2009).
Turkey has also set up an Energy Regulatory Board to monitor the energy 
sector30. “In 2002, the EMRA began to issue licenses for various activities in the 
electricity sector, to approve companies' tariffs and is basically responsible for 
energy supply security.” (Onel, n.d.).  Although the establishment, structure and 
capacity of the EMRA are legally aligned with the EU acquis, the Commission, in its 
reports, states that the independence and administrative capacity of this authority 
need to be strengthened, including in terms of the number of qualified staff it 
employs (European Commission, 2009). 
Electricity plants operated by natural gas are another issue which embodies a 
potential problem in Turkish energy sector. In a case of volatility in price of gas with 
an increasing trend and stability in prices of electricity, profit margins of these plants 
have decreased. However, according to statistics of EMRA (2008: 6), electricity 
plants operated by natural gas have the biggest share to meet the demand for a 
specific date in which the highest demand is recorded. Such inefficiencies and 
decrease in profits due to volatility in prices threaten electricity supply security.
In this sense, the acquis contributes to Turkish legislation and implementation 
                    
30 It should be noted that in the Commission reports the establishment of an energy regulatory board 
was mentioned as condition for International Monetary Fund (IMF) support for Turkey. In general, 
Turkey's priority in restructuring the energy sector is to attract investment and reduce state control.
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of necessary step for efficiency in electricity sector. According to World Energy 
Council (WEC) Report on European Electricity Market Vulnerability (2008: 59), “to 
ensure a regular supply of electricity in the foreseeable future there are three 
prerequisites: sufficient generation to meet demand, adequate infrastructure to 
deliver the power and robust technical and administrative operational procedures.” 
First of all, the EU acquis enables liberalization of the market by abolishing the 
vertical structure31. The dominant position of the state - owned company in the 
market becomes adjusted, and due to liberalization, the current restrictions for cross-
border trading are removed. Thus this makes the market more competitive and open 
for new foreign and domestic investments. The domestic electricity market becomes 
well-designed to work smoothly, thus the European internal electricity market gets 
affected positively. More investment means more development in the sector. 
Technical and administrative (education of staff employed) skills becomes better. 
The acquis also accelerates restructuring of companies since there are time tables in 
terms of most of the principles of the acquis. Since the acquis makes the market open 
for investments, construction of small or medium sized plants are enabled and it 
becomes much easier to meet the demand. For instance; in line with the acquis, in the 
projection report of EMRA (2008: 6), it is stated that throughout the period of 2008 –
2017 capacities of medium sized electricity plants operated by natural gas will be 
increased with assumption of no shortage of supply of natural gas. In addition to 
these, since further legislative and administrative steps are needed to be taken for 
                    
31 Vertical structure is in fact not an obstacle against liberalization of the market. Vertical structure 
becomes beneficial in a fully integrated liberalized market with various actors within the system. 
However, along with existence of one (or two) monopoly, in such a market, vertical structure prevents 
liberalization of the market. Due to vertical structure, the company which acts as monopoly prevents 
other small or medium sized companies to enter the market. Without mature and plausible conditions 
(such as existence of several actors), vertical structure becomes a threat against liberalization of the 
market. In Turkish case, as previously touched upon, there are several actors which are vertically 
integrated in the system. However due to limits in the legislation of Law 4628 and administration, 
private companies and other auto - producer groups cannot work efficiently within the market.
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proper functioning of a competitive electricity market in line with the acquis, it 
enables the Turkish sector to be more improvable.
4.1.2 Oil and Gas
As the Electricity Market Law, the Gas Market Law (Law 4646) is considered 
as a milestone for the energy sector by the Commission. The law basically enabled 
the gas market to be opened up. In 2002, regulation on licenses was adopted, and the 
gas market was opened up for international investment and production. Ongoing 
monopoly of Turkish Petroleum Pipeline Corporation (in Turkish: Boru Hatlari ile 
Petrol Taşıma Anonim Şirketi – BOTAŞ) and limited production of gas in Turkey 
have been surpassed by the Law 4646. The EMRA, established in 2001, was 
assigned with regulation of gas market in 2002. In addition, other necessary steps 
have been adopted on tariffs, transport and distribution networks, infrastructure, 
consumer services and internal installations. Along with liberalization of the market, 
Turkish energy [gas] sector has started to benefit from foreign investments.
In addition to Electricity Market Law (adopted in 2001) and Gas Market Law 
(adopted in 2002), the proposed Oil Market Law (2004) is considered as an 
important step for energy sector. However, due to concerns on national sovereignty, 
the law was partially vetoed in 2007. Adoption of this law is very crucial to 
accelerate liberalization, research and development, and to avoid legal risks in the 
sector. The law in line with the EU acquis will enable various companies and 
institutions to search for oil in Turkish territories. The new Petroleum Law of 2004 is 
a step forward in terms of alignment with the oil stocks acquis. However, oil stocks 
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are still not calculated according to EU methodology (European Commission, 2009).
“On security of supply, Turkey has already introduced important measures 
and its oil reserves are more or less at the level of the 90 days required by the acquis. 
Turkey also has an important role to play in the EU's security of supply since it is a 
transit country for oil and gas from the Caspian Sea, the Black Sea and Central Asia” 
(European Commission, 2009). Construction of the Blue Stream, the Turkey-Greece-
Italy Gas Interconnector, the Nabucco project and the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum pipeline 
are evident examples on Turkey’s role in the regional as an energy corridor.
Illegal smuggling is a serious problem for both Turkish oil and gas markets. 
Thus increase in measures and control to prevent this problem is a significant step in 
line with the EU acquis. In addition to this, due to competition in the market, tax 
rates in these sectors have been revised. Legislation allows switching to tax system 
where the balance between direct and indirect taxing is kept constant32.
4.2.3 Renewable Energy
Although generally renewable resources are more equally distributed and 
accessible than fossil and nuclear resources, use of this type of energy continues to 
have economic and technical constraints. Revisions and developments in the market 
of renewable energy bring significant benefits such as, energy supply security and 
shift of the sector to a more sustainable development and efficient path.
The problems in the energy efficiency and production yielded a common 
                    
32 Otherwise, even though taxes are one of the income sources for the state, high tax rates affect 
income distribution negatively. The optimal rate has to be maintained.
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response within the EU. In 2006, the Commission introduced the Green Paper on the 
European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy; touching upon 
ways to reduce the combined environmental and security of supply problems of the 
large fossil fuel consumption. The paper basically touches upon 6 key areas:
i) Complete the internal electricity and gas markets;
ii) Security of supply in the internal market;
iii) Tackling security and competitiveness of energy supply: towards a 
more sustainable, efficient and diverse energy mix;
iv) An integrated approach to tackle climate change in line with the 
Lisbon strategy;
v) A Strategic European energy technology plan;
vi) A common external energy policy.33
According to the Treaty of Establishing the Energy Community of October 
25, 2005, in Chapter VI (Renewable Energy Sources and Energy Efficiency), Article 
35, it is stated that “the Energy Community may adopt measures to foster 
development in the areas of renewable energy sources and energy efficiency, taking 
account of their advantages for security of supply, environment protection, social 
cohesion and regional development” (Stability and Growth Pact for South Eastern 
Europe, 2005: 12). Turkey is not yet amongst the parties of the Energy Community 
Treaty establishing a regional energy market in southeast Europe; and the Green 
Paper does not go beyond being a recommendation document for Turkish energy 
policies, since Turkey is not a member country of the EU.
On the other hand, Turkey adopted the Law 5346 for use of renewable energy 
resources for electricity generation in 2005.  The law basically “involves energy 
production and an implementing regulation on the guarantee of origin. The 
                    
33 European Commission, 2006.
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framework law also increases the potential for promoting the production of 
electricity from renewable energy sources” (European Commission, 2009). It still 
needs to be supplemented by ambitious objectives in order to exploit the vast 
potential of renewable energy sources, to make prices more attractive and to enable 
Turkey to compete with other major world powers, since after the current global 
financial crisis world economy would depart for economic boom.
Nevertheless, Turkey has not yet set a certain target for renewable energy. It 
is possible to infer that currently Turkey is only partially aligned in this area. “With 
regard to energy efficiency, Turkey has made some progress by adopting a 
framework law on energy efficiency, in order to reduce the high energy intensity of 
the Turkish economy. The law does not, however, contain any objectives and the 
provisions on high-efficiency cogeneration do not comply with the acquis” 
(European Commission, 2009).
Implementation of the EU acquis also enables Turkey to diversify its 
renewable energy resources. Efficiency and developments in different sectors or 
branches of energy such as biomass, hydro energy, geothermal energy, wind energy, 
solar energy (photovoltaic technology) are encouraged, as well as dependency on 
imported energy decreases due to diversification. In line with the EU acquis, Turkey 
benefits improvements in research and development in this sector. 
4.1.4 Nuclear Energy
In Turkey, electricity consumption has increased by 6-7% in recent years 
(Republic of Turkey – Prime Ministry, 2007: 4). Even if most of the energy sources 
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(coal, renewables, gas, et cetera) are used for electricity production, in medium and 
long term meeting demand will become a serious problem. Thus nuclear energy 
seems to turn into a necessity not only for its high efficiency in electricity 
production, but also for protection of the environment.
The Law 5710 (Construction and Operation of Nuclear Power Plants, and 
Energy Sale), adopted in 2007, aims to maintain supply security in medium and long 
term, to spread use of nuclear energy to every sector where necessary, to decrease 
dependency on foreign energy, and to stabilize energy prices. The framework law 
enables nuclear power plants which produce electricity to compete and have licenses 
(Republic of Turkey – Prime Ministry 2007: 4).
Although the law on installation of nuclear energy plants was adopted in 
2007, Turkey does not currently have nuclear plants in operation or under 
construction in any of its various cities. The Commission (2009) states that 
legislative alignment with the acquis must continue and administrative capacity 
needs to be built up if the nuclear plant construction projects are carried out. In 
addition to this, the Commission (2009) highlights the importance of independence 
of the Turkish Atomic Energy Authority (in Turkish: Türkiye Atom Enerjisi Kurumu 
– TAEK). Supervisory responsibilities are not separated from research and the 
promotion of nuclear energy. 
Nuclear safeguard issue is the other issue which has to be emphasized. 
“Turkey has concluded a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional 
protocol with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Several 
implementing provisions have been adopted on radiological protection, the basic 
safety requirements for nuclear power plants, nuclear safety inspections and 
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penalties, and exports of nuclear materials. Substantial upgrading of existing 
facilities will however be needed, including radioactive waste management and 
storage facilities” (European Commission, 2009). Turkey has not acceded to the Joint 
Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of 
Radioactive Waste Management34, of which the European Atomic Energy 
Community (or the EURATOM) became a contracting party in January 2006.
4.2 Turkey’s Role as an Energy Hub and its EU Accession Process
According to British Petroleum (BP) Statistical Review of World Energy, 
June 2009, in total world energy consumption, gas is listed as the third energy source 
used in the world with a share of 24.1 percent (oil is the leading energy source with a 
share of 34.8 percent; in the meantime with 29.3 percent coal follows oil as the 
second major energy source). According to the World Reference Scenario of World 
Energy Outlook (WEO) 2008 of the International Energy Agency (IEA), share of gas 
in the total world energy consumption will increase at least by 2 percent by 2030. In 
the European continent, member countries of the EU compose 17.9 percent of the 
total world oil consumption, 16.2 percent of the total world gas consumption (and 9.1 
percent of the total world coal consumption) (BP, 2009, 11, 27, 35).
The Middle East has 31.9 percent, and the Former Soviet Union (FSU) 
countries have 16 percent, conversely the EU has 2.7 percent of the world’s total 
proven oil reserves. Concerning the proven gas reserves, the Middle East composes 
12.4 percent of total gas reserves; the FSU has 25.8 percent; meanwhile the EU has a 
                    
34 To achieve a high level of safety; to maintain effective defenses against potential hazard; to prevent 
accidents with radiological consequences are among the objectives of this Convention (IEA, 1997).
91
share of 6.2 percent in the total proven gas reserves (BP, 2009: 7, 8, 24). Along with 
the fact that gas is the major energy resource consumed in the world; when ratios and 
amounts of consumption and proven oil reserves are compared, it will be evident that 
the EU is completely dependent on energy sources it imports.
Turkey lies next to a region which is rich of gas and oil reserves. Despite its 
location, Turkey is not bestowed with rich oil and gas reserves. However its 
proximity to these oil and gas rich countries becomes important in transportation of 
these energy sources to oil and gas importing countries. Thus, basically, Turkey has 
an aim to become an energy hub; a center where all energy routes intersect and all 
energy sources are delivered from. The European continent, which is poor in oil and 
gas resources, is dependent on the energy it imports. Russia, the North Sea and North 
Africa are the main sources which the EU meets its energy demand from; in this 
sense Turkey’s main goal is to become an alternative to these sources for the EU by 
hosting the routes from Caspian and the Middle East (Roberts, 2004: 19). Therefore, 
Turkey possesses an important position in the EU’s energy policies. As 
implementation of the EU acquis in energy sector, development of projects for 
mutual benefits between Turkey and the EU are essential for both parties.
East – West Energy Corridor is an expression used to define the energy route 
from basically Caspian to the western energy markets (mainly the EU countries. 
Targeted markets are: Balkans, Southeastern Europe, Central Europe and Western 
Europe). The ‘energy corridor’ term refers to the secure and efficient energy delivery 
route to meet European energy demand, whereas it depicts another meaning for the 
Caspian side; such as strengthening the independence and prosperity of Caspian 
states, encouraging market economy and forming economic linkages between all 
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consumer countries and supplier Caspian countries. Turkey, in this sense, shoulders a 
responsibility of being a bridge between these supplier and consumer countries. 
Turkey’s strategy in the Caspian region is to become a major investor and a mediator 
to promote mutual economic linkage and to ensure the secure flow of oil and gas 
resources to western energy markets. Since Turkey, which is a major consumer of oil 
and gas as well, is one of the dominant choices for diversified energy supply 
portfolio of the EU, the energy transportation projects in which Turkey is involved 
are considered very important.
The BTC Crude Oil Pipeline and the BTE Gas Pipeline are among the most 
significant arteries of East – West Energy Corridor, since they carry Caspian oil and 
gas without crossing Russian territory. These pipelines are important for EU energy 
policies, since the EU tries to diversify its energy routes and avoid over dependency 
on Russian resources. Meanwhile Trans Caspian Gas Pipeline Project is another 
component of East- West Corridor since it is planned to transport gas from 
Turkmenistan to the EU through Turkey. This pipeline project enables Turkey to 
strengthen its role in becoming an energy hub, instead of remaining as a consumer 
country (Socor, 2006). Along with massive gas amounts from Caspian to Europe, the 
possibility to integrate Trans Caspian Pipeline into the Nabucco Pipeline Project is 
another positive aspect regarding this project.
Turkey – Greece – Italy Interconnector is another project which is designed to 
transport Caspian gas through Turkey to the EU without crossing Russian territory 
with an aim of satisfying the EU’s energy demands. This project will make Caspian 
region available via Turkey and as the market grows in South Eastern Europe will 
gain another access to reach Caspian sources in order to meet increasing gas 
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demands of Europe.
The aim of the Blue Stream Gas Pipeline is to eliminate third counties in the 
gas transportation from Russia to Turkey. Blue Stream is, regarding Turkey’s 
position in energy politics, an important element to make Turkey a gas transmission 
corridor.  It has been recently debated to extend the pipeline to alternative regions. 
Although there are two alternatives for this plan35, the first and the most important 
one, concerning the EU – Turkey energy relations, is expansion of the pipeline to the 
EU through Bulgaria, Serbia, Croatia, ending with underground gas storage in 
Hungary (Alexander’s Gas and Oil Connections, 2007a). It would use Turkey as a 
transit point for gas export to the EU; Turkey will strengthen its position in becoming 
an energy hub. Meanwhile with respect to extension of the Blue Stream, Samsun –
Ceyhan Pipeline Project which is planned to form an alternative route for oil, Russia 
and Kazakhstan export, to reach world markets and to eliminate oil tanker traffic in 
Turkish straits, is a sister pipeline for Blue Stream 2 Project which is planned to be 
constructed parallel to Samsun – Ceyhan. Meanwhile there are also ongoing 
discussions to enlarge the length of the Iraq – Turkey Natural Gas Pipeline Project 
(which was constructed to transport Iraqi gas to Turkey from northern Iraq) to 
Europe.
In addition to both operational and proposed pipelines, Nabucco Gas Pipeline 
Project stands as a crucial component for Turkey’s passion to become an energy 
trade and transit center. The Nabucco Project is designed to deliver the Caspian, the 
Middle Eastern and Egyptian gas via Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary to 
Austria and further to the Central and Western European gas markets (Nabucco Gas 
Pipeline Project, n.d.).
                    
35 The second plan is to extend the pipeline to the Middle East, especially to Israel.
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Shares of the project company are equally distributed between the countries, 
OMV of Austria, MOL of Hungary, Transgaz of Romania, Bulgargaz of Bulgaria 
and BOTAŞ of Turkey. “RWE, E.ON Ruhrgas AG of Germany, Gaz de France and 
Total of France also declared their interest in the project. However, following 
Turkey’s strong resistance against French companies as a response to Nicholas 
Sarkozy’s obstructionist role in Turkey’s EU membership process, Gaz de France 
withdrew its interest in the project and Total was refused direct participation. 
Eventually RWE joined the project in February 2008, whereas France indirectly 
joined the project through Romanian Transgaz” (Ünver, 2009: 44)
“Nabucco Project, which, if it is developed in the way its promoters envisage, 
would do most to establish Turkey as Europe’s fourth artery” (Roberts, 2004: 19). In 
2000, 67 percent of European gas imports came from Russia (Domanic, n.d.: 6). This 
information is one of the evident examples of how dependent the EU is on Russia. 
“Potentially Nabucco can supply up to 5-10% of European gas demand, but in 
countries that are currently 100% reliant on one external supply route, it will provide 
immediate tangible security of supply benefits” (President Barroso and 
Commissioner Piebalgs welcome the signature of the Nabucco Intergovernmental 
Agreement, July 10, 2009). José Manuel Barroso, President of the European 
Commission, after the agreement of Nabucco Project, signed in Ankara in 2009, 
stated that the Nabucco project is very important for Europe's energy security and its 
policy of diversification of gas supplies and transport routes, besides he highlighted 
how beneficial the agreement between Turkey and the EU would be on the principles 
of mutual solidarity, mutual equality and interdependence (President Barroso and 
Commissioner Piebalgs welcome the signature of the Nabucco Intergovernmental 
Agreement, July 10, 2009). In addition to the advantages of the Nabucco for the EU 
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and Turkey, completion of the project will contribute to stability in the South 
Caucasus, which is the primary transit region hosting European Union-backed gas 
pipeline, and is expected to assist in the long-sought stabilization of the region 
(Adilgizi, 2009). Thus this project increases Turkey’s position regarding the EU’s 
energy security.
On the other hand although, at the first glance, the Nabucco Project might 
seem as an ideal project from which both parties, the EU and Turkey, will mutually 
benefit, there have been negative aspects and technical, geopolitical and economic 
inconsistencies about the project, concerning the EU, Turkey and the relationship in 
between.
The Nabucco Project faces the problem of limited production and export of 
Shah Deniz gas field which is listed as the main source of export of the project. Shah 
Deniz gas field has already been committed to several countries; such as Georgia, 
Turkey, Greece and Italy, to meet their domestic gas demands. When the total 
amount of gas committed to these four countries is deducted from the total amount of 
gas production in the two phases of gas production, only 3.6 billion cubic meters a 
year (bcm/y) remain for export which fulfills less portion of the project36. Besides, 
due to increase in the prices of gas Azerbaijan imports from Russia was increased by 
46 percent in the first quarter of 2007, Azerbaijan started to utilize gas it produces for 
its own domestic use. This is another factor contributing to the challenge of Shah 
Deniz gas that the Nabucco targets as the most reliable gas. In addition to these, 
pricing conflict between Turkey and Shah Deniz stakeholders is still awaiting a 
compromise between parties (Pamir, 2009: 38). Since 2008, parties have been 
                    
36 “The development of field is planned by the stakeholders to take place in two successive phases. 
The first phase is expected to produce 8.5 bcm/y, while the second phase will produce 16 bcm/y 
reaching a total peak volume of 24.5 bcm/y” (Pamir, 2009: 37)
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negotiating for new prices and set the price ceiling for sale and purchase. In order to 
increase the amount of gas in the project, adding Turkmenistan into the project as a 
supplier country does not seem possible since there have been a dispute between 
Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan “over ownership of the three Caspian fields” (Pannier, 
2009).
When the other alternative suppliers are analyzed, it becomes evident that the 
energy framework does not rely on reliable and stable resources. Iran, which has 16 
percent of world’s proven gas reserves, has, unlike its reserves, 3.8 percent in 
world’s total gas production (BP, 2009: 24) due to sanction and economic isolation. 
Besides, because of political reasons, Iran does not illustrate a reliable source of 
energy. Although Iranian energy market stands as an attractive market to invest, 
investors step back from their investment plans. Meanwhile, instability and lack of 
appropriate infrastructure in Iraq do not enable Iraq as an efficient source of energy 
feeding Nabucco. Egypt, on the other hand, does not introduce a source supplying 
large amounts of gas for the project.
One of the elements which must be touched upon is the Intergovernmental 
Agreement for the Nabucco Project. The problem about the signed agreement in 
2009 is that it does not involve supplier countries as signatory countries. With 
regards to Turkey’s position in the project, the Agreement does not meet Turkey’s 
expectations. There have been some issues considering Turkey, which turn into 
disadvantages. For instance; “one stop shop” concept contradicts Turkey’s claims to 
become an energy hub, since this concept authorizes only Nabucco International 
Company for purchase and sale (Pamir, July 20, 2009).
Nabucco is a third party access pipeline; at least 50% of its capacity will be 
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sold on the open market so that any shipper may buy capacity in order to ship gas 
(President Barroso and Commissioner Piebalgs welcome the signature of the 
Nabucco Intergovernmental Agreement, July 10, 2009). Since Turkey is a major 
consumer country, it demands to retain 15 percent of the gas, transported through the 
pipeline. However, the Agreement does not illustrate an optimistic figure. This 
demand was one of the most discussed issues between Turkey and the EU before 
signing the Agreement, since the EU officials strictly opposed Turkey’s demand. In 
the first clause of the related article (Article 3.3) of the Agreement, it is stated that 
“…fifty (50) percent of the maximum available total technical annual Transportation 
capacity in the Nabucco Project, but not more than 15 billion cubic meters per year 
in the event of a final expansion of capacity to 31 billion cubic meters per year, shall 
initially be offered to, and if accepted, reserved by the Shareholders, or their 
affiliates or transferees provided that the remaining capacity will be offered in a 
transparent, objective and non-discriminatory procedure for Shipper access…” 
(Agreement among the Republic of Austria, the Republic of Bulgaria, the Republic 
of Hungary, Romania and the Republic of Turkey regarding the Nabucco Project, 
July 13, 2009: 7). This article indicates that 50 percent of gas carried in the pipeline 
will be sold in open market. Stakeholders can have only remaining 50 percent of the 
total gas. This 50 percent is given “by a first option to the pipeline's owners or their 
affiliates; if these companies do not make use of this option, the capacity is offered 
on the open market” (President Barroso and Commissioner Piebalgs welcome the 
signature of the Nabucco Intergovernmental Agreement, July 10, 2009). Since there 
are 6 stakeholder companies, every stakeholder will have 16.6 percent, and it does 
not guarantee any volume to any partner. “The volumes will be ‘offered’ and at the 
terminal point (Baumgarten, Austria) without any commitment of volume and/or 
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price to any party, a competitive sales and purchase process will follow” (Pamir, 
2009: 42). 
4.2.1 Impacts of Turkey’role in energy security of the EU on its accession 
process
Turkey has been accused of “not belonging to Europe” by especially the 
right-wing politicians and supporters since the beginning of its accession process. 
Nicolas Sarkozy and Angela Merkel are the obvious current examples of political 
leaders, favoring this discourse. Throughout the fifty year EU accession period, 
Turkey has been exposed to negative ideological comments against its EU 
membership. To some Europeans, even if Turkey fulfilled the Copenhagen Criteria, 
it would never become a member of the EU, since either culturally or geographically, 
Turkey is not European. On the other hand, the other aspect some Europeans ask is 
how geopolitical importance of Turkey in the context of energy policies of the EU 
might affect Turkey’s long EU accession journey, as EU becomes much more 
demanding of energy imported day by day. The pipeline projects, in which Turkey is 
involved, and adoption and implementation of similar legislations in Turkey enable it 
to use these as significant leverages for negotiations. In order to have an answer 
about the issue, neoliberal assumptions and outcomes, which has already been 
discussed in the second chapter, are utilized in this section.
Interdependence is one of the basic assumptions of the neoliberal school of 
thought. Interdependence puts forth cooperation, which is desired and achievable 
according to neoliberalism. Cooperation is grounded on common interests and 
mutual benefit expectations, as preferences of actors become one of the crucial 
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elements. Preferences of Turkey, expectations of the EU as an institution determining 
who will be involved in the European political platform and negotiation dynamics 
affecting outcomes of maximization attempts are important. The energy sector in 
Turkey was one of the most important sectors which was considered as an issue of 
national sovereignty and was dominated by state - owned companies. Nonetheless, in 
oil, electricity and gas sector privatization has been implemented. With current 
developments, Turkey has allowed foreign investment to be made in energy sector in 
order to supply energy for increasing demand – which is actually an aspect of the 
European strategy – gives importance along with approximation of adopted laws in 
this sector. This obviously shows that domestic preferences of Turkey have been 
changed in accordance with the aim of becoming an energy hub. Implementation of 
the EU acquis on energy paves the way for Turkey to enjoy specific advantages 
which improve and develop the markets as well as the sectors. Besides, such parallel 
implementations, legislations enable Turkey to have common platform to get 
integrated into the European structure in terms of energy. In addition to these, 
absolute gains of Turkey, which it gets from cooperation, compose becoming a major 
investor in the Caspian region, increasing its geopolitical importance in the region.
On the EU side, the most important problem of the EU is over dependency on 
Russia for energy imports. Russia is the leading energy source for energy imported. 
For instance; Russia meets a significant percent of EU’s total gas demand (Unver, 
2009: 46). The EU also “depends on Russia, the second largest oil exporter, for … 
oil imports” (Cohen, 2004: 580). Meanwhile, it is presumed that European need for
natural gas will increase by 160 percent until 2030 (Domanic, n.d.). “Since the 
member states geopolitical position can be understood as a proxy variable for the 
imperatives induced by interdependence and, in particular, the…exogenous increase 
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in opportunities for cross-border trade and capital movements that should determine 
national preferences” (Moravcsik, 1998, in Moravcsik & Schimmelfennig, 2009: 81). 
In this sense, diversification of energy supply embodies a serious concern. In 
addition to these, relying on one source of energy creates other disadvantages. In 
winters of 2006 and 2009, when Russian – Ukrainian crisis occurred and blocked the 
flow of gas from Russia to the EU, it become clear that secure and reliable gas transit 
routes are crucial. With regards to common interests, joint actions for energy routes 
and proximal legislations enable both parties to benefit from advantages in the 
energy sector. For instance, as Turkey links the Caspian and the Middle East to the 
EU, it strengthens mutual economic linkage and prosperity. Since Turkey ensures a 
secure and reliable flow of oil and gas from suppliers to the consumers, common 
projects increase the level of economic cooperation between all parties. Nabucco, 
extension of Iraq – Turkey pipeline are fair alternatives for diversification of 
resources and decreasing dependence on Russia. In this sense Turkey, which is 
named the fourth artery, became one of the important routes for steady and 
uninterrupted gas routes, and Turkey started to be evaluated in a different 
perspective. It can be stated that its energy card afforded assistance to eliminate 
Turkey’s negative impression and enabled cooperation to maintain economic 
benefits.
A possible full membership would enable Turkey “to benefit from a more 
open and predictable investment climate in its energy sector; by gaining access to EU 
expertise and new funding options (for example from the European Investment Bank 
or Germany’s KfW, a state – controlled investment vehicle); and by giving Turkey a 
say in the EU’s external energy policy, so allowing the two to cooperate in the 
Caucaus and Central Asia” (Barysch, 2007: 6). In the meantime it is stressed that 
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Turkey’s full membership will introduce cost – effective means of transportation of 
energy sources from East to West (Tekin & Walterova, 2007, in Tekin & Williams, 
2009b: 10). BTC, BTE Pipelines and Nabucco Project enable Caspian gas to 
compete with Russian and OPEC oil in Europe. These absolute geopolitical and 
economic gains oriented from national preferences and expectations of the actors, 
yield joint action in an area where common interests are satisfied.
As states achieve cooperation for mutual benefits, policy coordination and 
along with distribution of the mutual gains from cooperation are also other elements 
to be taken into account. Specific agreements for forcing other actors to make 
concessions, to encourage flow of information about other actors’ preferences are the 
key elements. For instance; Accession Partnership Program of the Council with the 
annual reports of the Commission embodies a good example for flow of information, 
bargaining and concessions. As implementation of the acquis in Turkey is important 
to have parallel structure with the EU, negotiations on some chapters may not be 
opened, and this lengthens the process. For instance, “some key chapters relating 
energy, external relations and security and defense matters were held up by several 
EU member states, including France” (Morelli & Migdalovitz, 2009: 8). In addition 
to these, there has been weakness in the European Strategy for Turkey, which is, “as 
a mechanism for bringing Turkey closer to the EU in every field, this strategy was its 
preoccupation with reinforcing and extending the customs union arrangement above 
all else…The strategy was too one – dimensional. What Turkey needed most was … 
inclusion in the range of network projects in the fields of communications, transport, 
energy and the environment” (Rumford, 2000: 335). Even if the strategy of the EU is 
considered as one dimensional to some extent, joint actions regarding pipeline 
projects render Turkey advantageous in negotiations. Since negotiations in energy 
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chapter is not open (remain blocked because of the stance of Greek Cypriot 
administration), current pipelines, projects and Turkey increasing importance for 
secure energy routes to the EU might yield positive effects during negotiation 
process and might eliminate the blockage of talks on Chapter 15 (which is about 
energy). In this sense, energy routes through Turkey, emphasizing Turkey’s strategic 
importance as energy transit country, stand as a key policy item in membership 
negotiations.
Trans – European networks (TENs) are one of the most crucial elements of 
EU’s energy, transport, and telecommunication strategy. Trans – European energy 
networks (TEN – E), which is one of the three cornerstones of the TENs, “cover the 
transport and storage facilities of gas as well as the electricity transmission and make 
a significant contribution to the electricity and gas market” (European Commission, 
June 20, 2007: 1). TENs are the most significant element of joint action in which 
Turkey and the EU are involved for cooperation and coordination. “The European 
Commission believes that the development of TENs is important for boosting 
growth, competitiveness and employment and is seen as a good way of integrating 
the candidate countries” (Rumford, 2000: 338). In this sense, every energy route, 
going through Turkey has to be satisfying the both parties that these routes are well-
developed and reliable. For instance; inclusion of Iran as one of the supplier 
countries for the Nabucco Project, which has been given so much importance by the 
Turkish side, jeopardizes the importance of the project from eyes of the Europeans. 
Since Iran has not been appraised as a reliable and stable country by the world public 
opinion; it faces sanctions and does not cooperate with IEA on its nuclear program; 
this country creates a question mark for the necessity of the Nabucco Project as there 
have been discussions about lack of enough gas fulfilling the proposed amount of the 
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project.
“Turkey also has an important role to play in the EU's security of supply 
since it is a transit country for oil and gas from the Caspian Sea, the Black Sea and 
Central Asia” (European Commission, 2009). Construction of the Blue Stream, the 
Turkey – Greece – Italy Gas Interconnector, the BTC, the BTE and Iraq – Turkey 
pipeline and proposed projects; Nabucco, Trans Caspian Pipeline, are evident 
examples on Turkey’s role in the regional as an energy corridor. “Turkey, through 
the EU plan to build the Nabucco gas pipeline in part through Turkey, will play an 
even more important energy role and could play an important role with respect to 
Iraq, Iran, Russia, the Black Sea region” (Morelli & Migdalovitz, 2009: 12). 
However it should be borne in mind that despite energy being one of the important 
elements of the EU polities, energy and related issues compose only two or three 
chapters of the acquis, and there have been many other issues outlined in the acquis
– which Turkey has to satisfy. Along with energy sector, Turkey has to comply with 
the Copenhagen criteria. Since the amount of gas Turkey delivers to the EU does not 
guarantee membership, progress in every chapter of negotiations must be 
accomplished.
4.3 How important is Turkey to the EU?
This chapter gives a discussion about energy relations between Turkey and 
the EU. Neoliberalism has been chosen to analyze energy relations between the two. 
According to neoliberalism, actors in the world system are not only states; in fact in 
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this case study it is evident that the EU is a supranational actor37; whereas Turkey is 
a state. 
Since Turkish foreign policy gives considerable importance to membership to 
the EU, implementation of the acquis becomes important and the acquis has to be 
fully accepted and implemented. The acquis enables Turkey to have common targets 
with the EU and adapt its internal energy markets to the European system. Regarding 
energy, in either electricity, or oil and gas, or renewable and nuclear energy sectors, 
Turkey has accomplished several targets and had its internal markets compatible with 
the Union’s. Basically, compatibility between Turkey and the EU with regards to 
energy creates a link between Turkey and the Union. Implementation of the acquis
should not only be considered as a key to unlock the membership gate; yet it 
provides necessary suggestions and sound policies to prevent setbacks in the energy 
sector, such as smuggling, inefficiency and increasing costs. In addition to these, 
Turkey, like the EU, has been trying to find ways to decrease its dependency on 
imported energy sources. Thus implementation of parallel policies with the acquis
enables Turkey to develop diversification policies by giving importance to renewable
and nuclear energy; and to increase its absolute gains – which are to decrease its 
dependency on foreign resources and to have more sound policies for energy sector 
than it used to have. Briefly according to neoliberalism as energy related components 
of the acquis enables Turkey to benefit from absolute gains such as dispelling 
deficiencies in the energy markets and improving the sector, it also increases 
cooperation with the EU regarding energy. On the other hand inconvertibility of the 
acquis due to supranational structure of the EU and its dominance in one - dimension 
(which is that the EU introduces the rules and conditions; and Turkey has to accept 
                    
37 It should be noted that the EU is not solely a supranational actor; yet it has intergovernmental and 
transnational aspects within itself depending on structuring and functions.
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and implement) favors neorealist arguments. However explanatory power of 
neoliberalism is better than neorealism’s, when increasing cooperation and absolute 
gains; instead of focusing relative gains and race of power, are considered.
International regimes enable states to realize their common interests in 
economic affairs, and induce states to give more importance to absolute gains. 
Dependency of the EU on external resources of energy motivates its policies 
regarding Turkey. Turkey, which is perfectly aware of the fact, tries to enjoy the 
benefits of international projects, such as Nabucco Pipeline Project, Turkey – Greece 
– Italy Interconnector, which will favor its energy card over Europe and will 
strengthen its ties with the Union. Thus international projects become a tool for 
actualization of Turkey’s passion to become an important energy hub and increase its 
economic prosperity by distribution of energy sources and to have a concrete step 
towards EU – membership.
Increasing energy demands pressurizes the EU to have urgent actions, so 
diversification policies become significantly important. Diversification policy of the 
EU requires getting into closer relations with the Middle East and the Caspian 
(especially Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan – whose rich resources increase volume of 
flow of sources of the East to the West and by-pass Russia). Thus possible 
membership of Turkey as an alternative for efficient route may enable the EU to 
increase its influence on a larger geographical area than the area (mainly North 
Africa and Russia) the EU has now closer contacts with and meets its energy 
demands from. Turkish membership would also provide efficient and less costly 
route from the East to the West. Besides, Turkey is not only geographically 
important for efficient and relatively less costly energy routes; yet it also enables the 
EU to increase European influence in the Middle East and Caspian.
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Interdependence along with desire of increasing prosperity and national 
preferences pushes the EU and Turkey to have increasing cooperation. Common 
interests and targets yields joint actions which can easily be observed in joints 
international projects to be constructed for diversification, and safe/secure 
transportation of energy sources. Thus it can be stated that Turkey serves in favor of 
the collective interest of the EU which is to diversify not only the route but also the 
sources it imports energy from. 
On the other hand, Turkey’s efforts for compatible implementations and joint 
projects are not enough to pave Turkey’s way in favor of full – membership. The 
acquis, which provides sound policy coordination, constitutes a credible commitment 
towards Turkish accession. However, there is a variety of chapters in the acquis to be 
fully accomplished. Besides, to highlight energy policies of Turkey and EU’s 
dependency on external sources of energy as a vital element for EU – accession does 
not yield accurate and reliable outcomes. There have been many other routes built or 
to be built to meet EU’s energy demands and in these project Turkey is not involved. 
In addition to this, it is needless to say that Turkey’s willingness and active role in 
energy security of the EU is not enough to dilute opposition of some European 
countries to Turkish accession, although Turkey’s strategic importance has been 
recognized in reports of the Union. It should be borne in mind that Turkey is not the 
only choice for EU regarding energy. Turkey’s position in energy can only be an 
ignition for its accession process. Conversely procrastinating Turkish accession into 
the Union might cause some problems for the European side. Longstanding 
accession process and unwillingness of the EU regarding Turkish accession might 
cause a change in the foci of the Turkish foreign policy, to decrease cooperation with 
the EU and to favor Russia. Due to the fact that Turkey would develop and favor 
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projects which are not in favor of interests of the EU; yet are in favor of Russian 
interests, create setbacks for the European energy security. At the first glance, the 
evident example would be support of Turkey for involvement of Russian gas in 
Nabucco. Since Turkey provides a diversified and secure route for energy 
transportation, stability Turkey ensures for ease of access and transportation of 
energy resources creates balance against Russia which has been using its natural 
resources as a tool for international politics (as clearly seen in the case of Russian –
Ukrainian crisis recently). Besides, Turkish unsatisfaction might also affect aim of 
the EU – which is to enlarge its influence towards the Muslim world – and might 
negatively affect its interests in the Middle East.
As for the Turkish side, economic and common interests, integration with a 
strong union motivates Turkey to pursue a certain and parallel energy policies; for 
the European side, although Turkey does not constitute considerable importance for 
energy security of the EU in the short run; in the long run, it will become more 




THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND TURKEY
Turkey, whose relations with Russia had started centuries ago, has been a 
very important neighbor for Russia. After the collapse of the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics, relations of Turkey with the Russian Federation entered into a 
new era. Although in the first phase of emergence of the Russian Federation, Turkish 
– Russian relations were mainly focusing on competition over the Caspian region 
where the new independent states had emerged, the basis of current Turkish –
Russian relations comes from increasing cooperation, good neighborhood, joint 
actions, cooperation and coordination for stability and welfare. In the last years, it 
has been experienced that Turkey and Russia have become significantly important 
trading partners. Besides increasing trade interactions, since Russia possesses 
considerable amounts of energy resources such as oil and gas, and Turkey, as an 
energy consuming country, lies in between the rich energy resources and energy 
importing countries of the West, it can be stated that contemporary Turkish –
Russian relations are also shaped according to energy politics. Thus in the following 
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sections of this chapter, Turkish – Russian energy relations will be analyzed. Energy 
relations will first be highlighted concerning Turkey’s domestic energy needs and 
demands; and then Turkish – Russian energy relations with respect to particular EU 
energy demand oriented international energy projects, such as Nabucco Gas Pipeline 
Project, South Stream Gas Pipeline Project and Samsun – Ceyhan Crude Oil Pipeline 
Project will be touched upon. 
5.1 Turkey-Russia Energy Relations
Turkey is one of the fastest growing economies in the world. Turkey’s energy 
demands have been increasing year by year, as access to efficient and continuous 
energy is a necessity of the modern economies to be enhanced. Oil and natural gas 
are amongst the major primary energy resources Turkey uses. Regarding energy 
resources, Turkey is not able to utilize from its own resources due to scarcity in 
reserves. Thus Turkey is dependent with a relatively large ratio to energy imports.
Russia, as the leading natural gas exporter and the second oil exporter (EIA, 
2008: 1), is the main country of resource which Turkey feeds its energy demands 
from. Turkey exports approximately 65 percent of its natural gas from Russia (Hill 
and Taşpınar, 2006: 84)38.
                    
38 The current level of dependence on imported Russian gas has not decreased and Turkey still 
remains as the second Russian natural gas importer, following Germany.
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Table VI – Major recipients of Russian natural gas exports 2006 – 2007
Source: EIA, 2008: 11
In 2007, 48 percent of imports of “petroleum, petroleum products and related 
materials” and 56 percent of “manufactured gas” were originated from Russia 
(Undersecretariat of the Prime Ministry for Foreign Trade, 2007: 49). Turkey is 
ranked as the second major recipient of Russian natural gas exports, as shown in 
Table VI.
“Turkey’s imports from … Russia are mainly composed of mining products. 
In particular, 83 percent of imports from Russia … is made up of mining products” 
(Undersecretariat of the Prime Ministry for Foreign Trade, 2007: 18). As evident 
from the Table VII, main components of Turkey’s imports from Russia are natural 
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gas, petroleum and their by-products. Especially dramatic change in natural gas 
imports is an obvious proof for Turkey’s dependence on Russia for energy. “Imports 
of crude oil and oil products from the Russian Federation climbed by 48.7 percent 
while imports of gas increased by 19.3 percent in 2007” (Undersecretariat of the 
Prime Ministry for Foreign Trade, 2007: 49) and it has been experienced that this 
percentage rises year by year due to increasing demand for energy in 2008 and 2009.
Table VII - Primary Goods Imported from Russia (US Dollars)
Name of the product 2007 2008 Change
%
Town gas, water gas, petroleum gas, 
natural gas
6.677.221.466 11.070.113.384 0,66
Coal tar and crude oil products 9.242.372.044 10.242.081.169 0,11
Iron and steel 2.240.806.673 3.732.553.524 0,67
Metals different from iron 1.435.239.762 1.461.057.687 0,02
Coal and lignite 1.163.520.491 1.404.114.801 0,21
Metal ore 1.142.815.329 1.240.630.807 0,09
Cereals 264.065.821 592.196.716 1,24
Organic chemical products 288.798.330 362.450.117 0,26
Fertilizers 150.955.277 274.995.030 0,82
Paper and point paper 163.253.008 187.695.192 0,15
Other Products 739.446.087 796.588.435 0,08
TOTAL 23.508.494.288 31.364.476.862 0,33
Source: Undersecretariat of the Prime Ministry for Foreign Trade, 2009b: 6
If sale and purchase of natural gas and oil is assumed to be as a clerk – client 
relationship, it would be evident that Turkey, as a client, would definitely have a 
comparably low share in Russian imports. “The share of the Russian Federation, the 
largest trade partner of Turkey in the region, incremented by 2.2 points in the 
previous two years and became 10.2 percent in 2007” (Undersecretariat of the Prime 
Ministry for Foreign Trade, 2007: 16). Roughly, according to the latest statistics of 
Undersecretariat of Prime Ministry for Foreign Trade (2009: 5) Turkey’s share in 
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Russian imports is around 2 percent throughout the 2000s, whereas Russia’s share in 
Turkish imports, which has an increasing trend, is (slightly) over 15 percent till the 
end of 2008. “Due to the massive energy exports, surrounding countries (mainly the 
Russian Federation) have a greater share in the Turkish foreign trade compared to the 
neighboring countries” (Undersecretariat of the Prime Ministry for Foreign Trade, 
2007: 57).



















2000    644 1,43 3.887 7,16 -3.243 4.531
2001    923 1,72 3.436         8,60 -2.513 4.359
2002 1.168 1,92 3.863 7,58 -2.695 5.031
2003 1.363 1,82 5.420 7,88 -4.057 6.783
2004 1.851 1,92 9.009 9,27 -7.158 10.860
2005 2.371 2 12.818 11,05 -10.447 15.189
2006 3.227 1,84 17.494 12,77 -14.267 20.720
2007 4.727     2,08 23.506      13,82 -18.779 28.233
2008 6.481 2,21   31.317 15,51 -24.836 37.798
Source: Undersecretariat of the Prime Ministry for Foreign Trade, 2009b: 5
As figured out in Table VIII, although the volume of trade between two 
countries has significantly increased, the balance of trade does not follow a positively 
increasing trend; conversely the gap has been increased year by year. Needless to say 
that the major component of this imbalance of trade is natural gas and oil imports 
from Russia. “…the Russian Federation is gaining share in Turkey’s foreign trade 
volume. Particularly the rise in energy prices increases Turkey’s trade deficit with 
the Federation” (Undersecretariat of the Prime Ministry for Foreign Trade, 2007: 16). 
The deficit resulted from Turkey’s trade relations with Russia composes one third of 
the total trade deficit of Turkey (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2009b).
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Although economic interactions between these two countries deepen, Russia 
strengthens its energy card over Turkey. Depending on only one source for energy 
enforces Turkey to accept Russian price setting for every energy resource Turkey 
imports (Pamir, January 29, 2010). “The rise in energy prices and the Russian 
Federation’s gaining share in Turkish energy imports brought forth the Russian 
Federation as the top country in Turkish imports.” (Undersecretariat of the Prime 
Ministry for Foreign Trade, 2007: 51). In addition to these, Turkey is obliged to pay 
for the gas it does not consume, since it commits to buy a certain amount of gas as 
indicated in the “take or pay” condition in articles of the agreements (Chamber of 
Mechanical Engineers, 2005). 
5.2. Russia as Nuclear Energy and Gas Storage Expert?
According to report of the Turkish Electricity Transmission Company (in 
Turkish: Türkiye Elektrik İletim Anomim Şirketi – TEİAŞ), entitled ‘Electricity 
Energy Generation Planning Study for Turkey (2005-2020)’ which provides 
guidance for the decision makers, investors and market actors on the timing, 
composition and capacities of the additional electricity generation sources needed for 
the next 15 year period, Turkey’s electricity demand increases 7.9 percent per year 
(Nuclear Energy Agency, 2008). This datum is a promising assertion in favor of 
nuclear plants. With regards to nuclear energy, the Law on Construction and 
Operation of Nuclear Power Plants and Energy Sale (Law 5710), which stipulates the 
procedures and principles concerning the construction and operation of nuclear 
power plants for electricity production and energy sale (Nuclear Energy Agency, 
2008), was adopted in 2007. Although hitherto Turkey has not had any nuclear 
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power plants, many regulations about the licensing and safety of nuclear 
installations, have been issued to date. 
As mentioned in the chapter II, Turkey has had a long period of time to 
decide and actualize construction of a nuclear plant. The concrete step was taken in 
2009 and 2010 in which Turkish and Russian governments signed several protocols 
on cooperation for nuclear energy plant acquisition. On August 6, 2009, in the 
context of visit of Prime Minister of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, to 
Turkey, Agreement Regarding Cooperation for the Use of Nuclear Energy on 
Peaceful Purposes and Agreement on Early Notification of Nuclear Accidents and 
Exchange of Information on Nuclear Facilities which envisage cooperation for 
nuclear energy were signed, in addition to 3 protocols regarding cooperation in two 
main fields, which are natural gas and petroleum.
During the visit President of the Russian Federation, Dmitry Medvedev, to 
Turkey in May 2010, 17 agreements on various fields were signed. Among these 
agreements, the one most prominent issue was about nuclear energy and partnership 
of Russia and Turkey. Agreement on Cooperation Regarding Construction and 
Operation of Nuclear Power Plant in Akkuyu was signed upon a unit price of 12.35 
cents (Enerji – Energy Internet Portal, May 13, 2010). After ratification of the 
agreement by the Turkish Parliament, it is expected to construct the nuclear plant, 
which is presumed to cost 20 billion dollars, in seven years39. It is decided to have 4 
nuclear reactors, constructed by a Russian company, Rosatom, which will have 
hundred percent of the shares of the plant in the first phase, and will open a bid for 
49 percent of the shares to other investors in the following years. Due to agreements 
                    
39 Previously, there were four auctions for construction of the possible nuclear plant in Akkuyu –
Mersin. The last one which authorized a Turkish – Russian company, Atomstroyexport – Inter RAO –
Park Teknik, was cancelled in November 2009 (Enerji – Energy Internet Portal, May 13, 2010).
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of Rosatom in other countries, especially in China, India and Iran, the company is not 
allowed to play any role in management positions or to be one of the shareholders 
(Hürriyet, May 14, 2010).
The domestic energy sector in a country has to provide safe and sufficient 
energy to consumers in a case of possible problems and challenges such as long 
winter circumstances, increase in prices of energy imported or energy cuts. In order 
to supply changing demands and also peak demand for energy, gas storage plants are 
needed. In Turkey, which has a high level of demand for natural gas, the necessity 
for gas storage becomes important. Since underground storage plants are much safer 
and less costly than over ground plants (Petroleum Pipeline Corporation, 2005: 4), 
spores under the salina of Lake Tuz are more appropriate for such a project besides 
the other gas storage plants in operation in Turkey40. Even though there are not any 
recent developments regarding natural gas storage plants in Turkey, especially by the 
Memorandum of Cooperation of Gazprom and Petroleum Pipeline Corporation for 
Natural Gas of 2004, Russian energy companies has been involved in almost every 
natural gas storage bids (Fitin, n.d.). One of the recent examples from 2010 would be 
that one of the energy companies which Gazprom has 71 percent of shares of, 
Bosphorus Gas, is aiming to bid for the natural gas storage plants (Hürriyet, March 
13, 2010).
5.3 Russian Involvement in Energy Routes Passing Turkey
As highlighted since the beginning of the thesis, Turkey strives for becoming 
                    
40 In 1999, the Petroleum Pipeline Corporation and the Turkish Petroleum Corporation signed an 
Agreement on Storage and Production of Natural Gas, in order to transform the Northern Thrace 
region, where natural gas production is also conducted, into a natural gas storage plant. (WEC – TNC, 
2009: 16)
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an energy hub, carrying rich energy sources of the East to the world markets which 
have increasing energy deprivation from day to day. Russia, as one of the major oil 
and gas producers in the world, chooses Turkey as one of the main transit countries 
for delivering its oil and gas. Thus, there have been various accomplished and 
ongoing projects between Turkey and Russia to maintain safe and efficient energy 
transportation to consuming countries.
In chapter III, energy routes passing through Turkey were explained. In 
addition to current pipelines which are in operation; ongoing projects, which are 
expected to be carried out within a few years, were also expounded upon. Nabucco 
Gas Pipeline Project, South Stream Gas Pipeline Project and Samsun – Ceyhan 
Crude Oil Pipeline Project are amongst the most important projects which are in 
agenda to be discussed as significant efforts of Turkey to consolidate its efforts to 
become an energy center. However there are also privative points regarding these 
projects in the sense of hindering Turkey’s efforts to strengthen its role in energy 
policy. Thus, in this section positive and negative aspects of cooperation with Russia 
for international projects for gas and oil transportation are discussed.
5.3.1 Nabucco Gas Pipeline Project with Russian gas involved
The Nabucco Gas Pipeline Project was introduced as a project serving in 
favor of diversification policies for energy of the EU to decrease dependency on 
Russia. Azerbaijan (through Baku – Tbilisi – Erzurum gas pipeline), Iran, Iraq 
(through proposed Iraq – Turkey gas pipeline project at a later point in time) and 
Egypt were involved in the project as main gas supplier countries in 2005 (Pamir, 
2009: 37). However, insufficient resources of Iran and Egypt, instability in Iraq and 
due to Azerbaijan’s gas commitments to other parties and projects, lack of efficient 
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amount of gas satisfying the expected volume of the Nabucco project stand as 
important problems against the project in terms of gas supply. In other words, 
geopolitical, economic issues and drawback in committed amount of gas from 
previously listed supplier countries, Russian gas started to be considered as an 
alternative in addition to the countries above. As a matter of fact, Reinhard Mitschek, 
who is the managing director of the Nabucco Gas Pipeline International Company, 
admits that Russian gas can be involved in the project (Mitschek, 2009: 4). 
The specific target in such international projects is to enhance safe and secure 
supply of energy resources – which requires balanced diversification of supplies –
with ease of access to cheap gas. The Nabucco stakeholders (which were elaborately 
listed in the previous section about the EU – Turkey relations) are mainly dependent 
on imported Russian gas, as figured out in Table IX.
Table IX – Nabucco Stakeholders’ Gas Import Dependency to Russia 
(2008)
Country Import Total 
Consumption
Dependency
Germany 36.20 87.10 41.6 %
Turkey 23.55 37.61 62.7 %
Romania 3.50 4.50 77.7 %
Austria 5.80 8.10 71.60 %
Hungary 8.90 11.50 77.4 %
Bulgaria 3.10 3.10 100 %
Source: Pamir, September 30, 2009: 112
When Nabucco was first introduced, the selling point about the project was 
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that it was completely free of Russian gas and significantly in favor of the EU’s 
policy for diversification of energy sources. However, involvement of Russia does 
not distinguish the Nabucco Project from any other Russian gas oriented pipeline 
project. Vladimir Socor, who is a political analyst of East European affairs,  states 
that “…This is not what Nabucco was, is and should be about…With Russian gas, it 
does not matter whether this project is called Nabucco or Rigoletto or Aida” (Pamir, 
2009: 37). The project, in this state, will not enable its stakeholders to decrease 
dependency percentages on Russian gas. Besides, this arouses suspicion in European 
creditors and investors about the project, since basically with the Russian gas they 
will be investing money for an additional Russian energy service. 
5.3.2 South Stream Gas Pipeline Project
South Stream is defined by the Russian state – owned company, Gazprom 
(2010) as the other real step of the company to diversify the Russian gas supply 
routes and deliver gas to Europe by contributing energy security of the entire 
European continent with a system meeting the latest environmental and technological 
requirements. “The first component the South Stream pipeline at Beregovaya for 560 
miles (900 km) under the Black Sea” to Varna (Country Analysis Brief: Russia, 
2008: 12). The subsea was first proposed to cross Russian, Ukrainian, Romanian and 
Bulgarian economic zone. “The second, onshore component will cross Bulgaria with 
two alternatives; one directed towards the southwest through Greece and Albania; 
linking directly to the Italian network in Adriatic” (Country Analysis Brief: Russia, 
2008: 12). The other alternative is to by-pass Greece and to construct the project 
through Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Slovenia, Macedonia, Albania, Montenegro, 
Italy and finally Austria. The aim of the project is not only to send gas to Europe and 
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also, upon suggestion of Greece, to feed the Italy-Greece Interconnector.
Since 2006, Ukraine and Russia have a dispute over price of cubic meter gas 
and debts which were not paid by Ukraine. The first outbreak of the incident was that 
in January 2006 Russia cut off supplies to Ukraine and caused gas shortages in 
European countries. In 2008, as in 2006, unpaid debts of Ukraine evoked gas cutoffs, 
although the Ukrainian government stated that they made the payment. In 2009, the 
crisis started again because of failure to reach an agreement on gas prices. These 
recent developments in relations between Russia and Ukraine, which was a partner of 
the South Stream Gas Pipeline Project, caused Ukraine to be expelled from the 
project. Currently the project route has been revised and the new route is planned to 
cross through Turkish economic zone in Black Sea, instead of Ukrainian economic 
zone. Exclusion of Ukraine, which transports 80 of gas supplies from Russia to the 
EU (Weihe, 2007: 35), strengthens Turkey’s position regarding energy routes from 
Russia passing through the Black Sea. In the gas protocol between Russia and 
Turkey, which was signed on August 6, 2009, authorization of feasibility research 
done by the Russian Federation in Turkish economic zone of Black Sea in the 
context of South Stream Project, feasibility research for projects in which Turkey 
serves as a route for gas delivery to the third parties, in addition to issues such as 
construction of underground gas storage facilities, prolongation of Agreement on 
Purchase and Sale of Natural Gas (Memorandum for Western Route – I) dated 
February 14, 1986; and consortium of Gazprom and Turkish Petroleum Corporation 
in third countries was also included in the protocol. In the agreements between 
Russia and Turkey, signed in May 2010, South Stream Gas Pipeline Project was 
again touched upon.
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On the other hand, the South Stream Gas Pipeline Project itself embodies an 
obstacle against the Nabucco Gas Pipeline Project which is considered as one of the 
agreements of the century signed for energy (Hürriyet, July 2009). In the context of 
actualization of the project, Gazprom first signed a deal with ENI, Italian
multinational gas and oil company (which was in cooperation with Gazprom for the 
Blue Stream Project) on November 24, 2007. “On January 18, 2008, Russia and 
Bulgaria signed an inter – governmental agreement providing for Bulgaria's 
participation in the South Stream project” (Gazprom, 2010). Afterwards, on February 
28, 2009, Russia and Hungary signed an inter – governmental agreement. In 2009, 
Hungarian Development Bank and Bulgarian Energy Holding signed Cooperation 
Agreement for implementation of the project (Gazprom, 2010). Bulgaria and 
Hungary are also the signatory countries of the Nabucco Agreement. Besides before 
these developments in 2008 and 2009 with two of Nabucco partners, “on November 
5, 2008 Austria’s OMV energy company advanced toward a final agreement with 
Russia’s Gazprom to share the Baumgarten gas terminal near Vienna. That terminal, 
however, is the designated end point and regional distribution center for the Western-
backed Nabucco gas transport project. Sharing Baumgarten with Gazprom risks 
pulling the rug from under the Nabucco project” (Sokor, 2008).
Both projects embody strategic and political importance. However both 
projects have the same target as customer – which is the EU. These projects reduce 
chances of each other to be built. According to some political – and maybe optimistic 
– views, these two projects are complementary to fulfill Europe’s increasing energy 
demands; conversely these two are planned to actualize on the same lane. When all 
of the information is analyzed, such a conclusion would not be wrong that South 
Stream and Nabucco are rival projects. Besides, although Nabucco aims to diversify 
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EU energy dependency for different suppliers, Russia becomes another alternative 
for source of energy carried through Nabucco41, then both of the projects becomes 
similar in a sense – which strengthens the rivalry between two. 
5.3.3 Samsun – Ceyhan Crude Oil Pipeline Project
Samsun – Ceyhan Project is proposed oil pipeline which is planned to 
transport Russian oil from Black Sea to the Mediterranean, by-passing the Bosporus 
and the Dardanelles.  
The real step to actualize of the project was taken in 2009. Actualization of 
common projects and initiatives between Turkish and Russian petroleum 
corporations on discovery and extraction of hydrocarbon resources in Russia, Turkey 
and third countries; confirmation of the Russian government to take part in 
actualization of Samsun – Ceyhan Crude Oil Pipeline Project, forming a group of 
experts for the Samsun – Ceyhan Crude Oil Pipeline Project, support of Russian 
government to Russian petroleum corporations to supply crude oil into the project 
and to construct refineries for Samsun – Ceyhan Crude Oil Pipeline Project and 
marketing of goods to the world markets were amongst the issues agreed upon in the 
petroleum protocol of August 6, 2009. Following this protocol, in October 2009, 
Italian, Turkish and Russian companies signed a memorandum of understanding to 
discuss conditions to allow Russian companies to participate in the project (Dow 
Jones Deutschland, October 19, 2009). The other positive step regarding the project 
was taken during visit of the President of the Russian Federation, Dmitry Medvedev, 
                    
41 It is obvious that offshore projects are more expensive to construct than onshore ones. The cost of 
the South Stream is around €16 billion – which costs twice as much as Nabucco (The total estimated 
cost of Nabucco is €7.9 billion) (Spiegel, 2009).
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to Turkey in May 2010. Protocols of May 2010 touch upon Samsun – Ceyhan Crude 
Oil Pipeline project which was highlighted in the Agreement on Cooperation 
Regarding Delivery of Crude Oil in Black Sea Zone Prioritizing Samsun – Ceyhan 
Crude Oil Pipeline (besides South Stream Project and extension of Blue Stream)  
(Enerji – Energy Internet Portal, May 13, 2010).
On the other hand, Burgas – Alexandroupolis Crude Oil Pipeline Project, 
which is planned to start from Bulgarian coast on Black Sea and to end on Aegean 
coast of Greece, stands as a rival42 to Samsun – Ceyhan Crude Oil Pipeline Project to 
carry Russian and Caspian oil. However, since the pro – western government in 
Bulgaria, which came to power after the elections in 2009, does not implement 
parallel polities with Russia, Bulgaria’s position in the project, thus the project itself, 
becomes unclear. This is the reason of Russia’s sudden interest in Samsun – Ceyhan 
Crude Oil Pipeline Project as an alternative project (Euroactiv, October 20, 2009).
5.4 Dependence or Interdependence?
This chapter gives detailed explanation about the scope of Turkish – Russian 
energy relations. Through theoretical perspective, neoliberalism has been chosen to 
analyze the outcomes, since assertions of neorealism remain weak to explain 
increasing cooperation and motivations for energy policies of Turkey and Russia. On 
the other hand, in order to have a better theoretical explanation of the energy 
                    
42 Burgas – Alexandroupoli is not the only alternative for Turkish straits by – pass plans. Pan 
European Oil Pipeline, which is a proposed pipeline, starting from Romania, crossing Serbia, Croatia 
and Slovenia and then ending in Italy, is another alternative plan to transport Russian and Caspian oil 
to the European markets. The existing Odessa – Brody pipeline between Ukraine and Poland is 
another alternative for Turkish straits by – pass plans. However negative developments between 
Russia and Ukraine decreases the chance of the pipeline to become a major element for transportation 
of oil from Russia and Caspian in Turkish straits by – pass plans.
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relations, complex interdependence, a sub – variant of neoliberalism is utilized, since 
it gives a clear definition of levels of interactions.
The Russian – Turkish relations better fit into complex interdependence 
concept, rather than only the interdependence term of neoliberal approach. In the 
interactions of Turkey and Russia regarding energy, it is observed that there are not 
only states involved in relations; yet there are various channels through which energy 
relations are built upon. In the relations between these countries, it is obvious that 
aside from governments, deepened relations with companies in energy sector stand 
out. Interstate relations, transgovernmental relations and transnational relations are 
the basic channels for complex interdepence to pursue affairs between countries. The 
case of energy relations of Turkey and Russia satisfies all of these channels by 
agreements, talks between governments and companies. These channels provide 
adequate policy coordination. On the other hand official visits of the Russian 
President and Prime Minister, representing the state, might hinder this notion. What 
has been observed is that generally the statesmen direct the energy relations between 
these two countries. Following the visits, subsequently signed protocols and 
agreements might show that interactions are generally conducted at interstate level 
and this might favor neorealist arguments. However it should be considered that 
energy relations are not only composed of interstate interactions; yet there have been 
other channels deepening cooperation between these two countries.
Common economic interests, aims to fully integrate with the world markets, 
and to utilize and to share technologic developments motivate the basis for formation 
of energy policies between Russia and Turkey. Construction of nuclear plant in 
Turkey and mutual gains from international pipeline projects such as Nabucco, South 
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Stream are basic examples. Market widening (meaning cooperation not only in 
transportation of energy sources; yet collective actions in other fields of energy 
sector; so that the area in which Turkey and Russia build their relations enlarges) is 
the basic tool of energy policies of these two countries. On the other hand it can also 
be stated that the Russian side has been trying to use market widening as tool to 
increase its dominance on countries which are dependent on Russian energy sources. 
Neorealists might claim that, although cooperation in energy might be achieved, this 
cooperation basically favors Russian aims to make every possible actor in the system 
dependent on itself, so that it would enable Russia to increase its power for regional 
politics and, maybe, for politics in a wider scope. However the mutual benefits of 
both Turkey and Russia and inexistence of competition – which might urge these 
countries to seek for relative gains, decreases explanatory power of neorealism and 
favors neoliberalist arguments.
Relative gain concept of neorealism cannot fully explain common interests in 
economic affairs which are mainly observed in energy relations of Turkey and 
Russia. Thus “absolute gain” concept becomes more adequate for better explanation. 
Aims to increase economic relations and to enjoy economic gains have been 
observed especially in the last decade of the Turkish – Russian energy relations.  
Each state is concerned of their economic interests, and relativity of their gains is not 
important. For instance; South Stream is a project, introduced to diversify routes of 
Russian energy transportation, whereas Nabucco is a project developed to decrease 
dependency on Russian energy sources. There have been changes in both of the 
projects in favor of both countries; Turkey is planned to be included in the South 
Stream, and due to some technical and efficiency problems Russian gas is planned to 
be involved in Nabucco. In both cases Russia obtains economic gains. Conversely as 
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discussed in the previous sections, rivalry between these two projects may cause 
Turkey to suffer decrease in its gains. However even though both projects are rivals, 
and existence of one project decreases importance of the other and chance of 
actualization, both projects would definitely contribute Turkey’s absolute gains by 
favoring its activeness in transportation of energy routes of the East to the West. 
Collective policies and benefits with cooperation constitute a backbone 
regarding international energy projects. Russia aims to diversify its energy routes and 
maintain a secure path to deliver its energy sources to world markets, meanwhile 
Turkey tries to meet its own energy demands and to attract all energy-exporting 
countries to become an energy hub, and distribute energy sources from its territory to 
world markets. In this sense, these interests coincide and yield cooperation in the 
field of energy.
In addition to these, what has been observed in the Turkish – Russia relations 
in order to prevent cheating and causes for future problems which might result in 
decrease in cooperation, joint actions and credible commitments are achieved. For 
instance; Turkey committed Russia to construct one nuclear plant without initiating 
any bids, in order to assure full Russian support for Samsun – Ceyhan Crude Oil 
Pipeline project. During the visits of Russian authorities, Samsun – Ceyhan was 
favored in the agreements; so that it creates a commitment for actualization of the 
pipeline – which increases Turkey’s absolute gains (such as preventing actualization 
rival projects, increasing its geostrategic importance, maintenance safety in Turkish 
straits).
This cooperation opened a new era in Russian – Turkish relations. After the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union, as the newly founded Russian Federation was trying 
126
to maintain its influence on Caspian, Turkey was aiming to liaise with independent 
Caspian states and cooperate with them to deliver their rich sources to the world. In 
this sense, the Federation and Turkey were two main parties of a tough competition. 
However, especially with the recent developments cooperation for international 
projects, as well as for domestic needs of Turkey, turned into a smooth competition 
for regional policies. Briefly, “yet throughout the 1990s, the dramatic decrease in 
threat perception on both sides ways indeed conductive for the warming of Turkish –
Russian relations and for the emergence of a plethora of common interests ranging 
from trade to the certain affinities in the two countries’ strategic outlooks” 
(Torbakov, 2007: 6).
On the other hand, aforementioned arguments also result in negative effects, 
as they also yield positive outcomes. Interdependence also causes setback in relations 
between two. “Unilateral dependency generates unbalanced power and abuses” 
(Weihe, 2007: 33). In the case of Nabucco project, involvement of Russia hinders 
Turkey’s deal of century for becoming an energy hub. Although Turkish – Russian 
economic relations have been deepening, the trade deficit of Turkey due to its over 
dependency on Russia for energy sources imported, is amongst negative aspects. 
Besides, signing agreement with Russia for construction of nuclear reactors without 
initiating any bids, just to gain support of the Russian Federation in favor of Samsun 
– Ceyhan Crude Oil Pipeline Project is another setback regarding energy issues. 
There might have been many other companies involved in the bid – which could 
have proposed lower costs, and if European companies were involved in construction 
of the nuclear plant, it might have been much more compatible with the European 
standards for nuclear safeguards. It is obvious that these relations deepen the 
economic relations between Russia and Turkey; yet, in the meantime, these cases 
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causes Turkey to depend on Russia with a considerable percentage. Thus it is not 
hard to reach a conclusion that unilateral dependency occurs in energy relations 
between Turkey and Russia. Although economic interests are maximized through 
cooperation, Russia becomes mostly favored party, whereas Turkey tries to gain 
more absolute gains to a limited extent, since Turkey is not the only country for 
Russia’s aim to diversify its routes and to participate in international energy projects. 
Nevertheless, unilateral dependency does not mean that the energy relations fit into 
neorealist approach; yet it is one of the consequences of cooperation in the relations 




This thesis has aimed to explain and analyze energy relations of Turkey with 
its major allies and neighbors. Thus there have been three case studies in the thesis 
which basically touch upon energy relations of Turkey with the USA, the EU and 
Russia. These energy relations have been analyzed in a certain periods. Turkish –
American relations were also discussed in three section – which expound upon 
energy relations of Turkey, the USA and neighbors of Turkey; Azerbaijan (usually 
referred as Caspian), Iran and Iraq. Mainly the time period chosen to be analyzed is 
the last decade for each (However for the Caspian there have been given examples 
earlier than 10 years time). The second case study which touches upon energy 
relations of Turkey and the EU, has taken start of the official candidacy status of 
Turkey as the initial point. In the meantime the last decade of the Turkish – Russian
energy relations were analyzed since dense interactions especially in energy have 
been observed. This thesis has tried to find motivations behind the energy policies 
and discussed tools to achieve certain energy policies. In the final run, how Turkish 
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foreign policy gets affected by energy policies and Turkey’s position in world energy 
politics have been discussed.
In order to strengthen arguments and assessments, this thesis has utilized two 
theories; neorealism and neoliberalism – variants of two grand theories. Through the 
theoretical analyses, especially relative and absolute gains and channels used by the 
actors for maximization of interests are considered while choosing the theory to be 
utilized for each case. For the first case study, due to explanatory power of 
neorealism about influence of dominant state, relative gain concept and 
maximization of national interests, Turkish – US relations have been examined 
through neorealist approach. Conversely, considering the structure of the actors in 
the system, negotiation and mutual interaction, for the Turkey – EU case, 
neoliberalism has been used, in the meantime the same theory has been chosen to 
analyze deep cooperation in economic affairs, common interests and credible 
commitments for the third case which touches upon Turkish – Russian energy 
relations. However complex interdependence; a sub-variant of neoliberalism has 
been mainly utilized for analysis of the Turkish – Russian energy relations, since it 
gives a better explanation for different levels of channels to pursue interactions.
This thesis has not aimed to compare and contrast these three cases; yet 
utilized mainly textual analysis as methodology. Every case has been examined 
separately from each other, and it has been tried to give broader explanation of each 
energy relations through theories. The study has aimed to discuss and find an answer 
of which energy policy or relations fit into which theory and what the possible 
outcomes and expectations are. Each chapter ends with its own conclusion and each 
case study has been analyzed through the theory applied for certain reasons.
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First of all the thesis analyzes Turkey energy profile, aiming to yield better 
assessments for the case studies. The first outcome would be that Turkey is 
dependent on external energy sources and thus its energy policies remains as supply 
– oriented. The increasing demand in Turkey especially affects its relations with 
Russia due to increasing volume of energy trade. Meanwhile, pipeline and pipeline 
projects compose the other dimension of Turkey’s energy policies. Especially for 
increasing cooperation in safe and secure transportation of energy resources also 
compose significant part of energy relations of Turkey with other three countries.
With regards to the Turkish – American relations, the first assessment is that 
there have not been direct energy relations with the USA, their interactions in energy 
mainly rely on US influence and dominance. Since energy is evaluated as a key 
element for wealth and power, it becomes an issue of national interest and security. 
In the Caspian, predominantly, policies of the USA and Turkey’s aim correspond, on 
the other hand due to dominance of US politics regarding that region, Turkey has 
been facing some setbacks (such as increase in price of Azerbaijani gas in retaliation 
because of Turkish – Armenian normalization talks). Regarding the Middle East 
(Iran and Iraq), possibility of a threat which might challenge the USA and its security 
and passion to maximize its relative gains narrows Turkey’s role in the region. 
According to the research pointed out in this thesis, the outcome about the relations 
between these two countries would be that energy relations have been directed by the 
US influence. Turkey fully enjoys the advantage of cooperation, if it gets support 
from the USA. In a case of a condition which is against the US interests, Turkey has 
to be contented with the outcomes resulted from the position of the USA. Thus it can 
be stated that Turkey cannot act as a sovereign regional actor regarding either 
Caspian or the Middle East and without the support of the USA the role it plays 
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shrinks. Thus through the neorealist approach, it can be stated that there has been 
little cooperation between these two countries.
For the energy relations between Turkey and the EU, the assessment is about 
the importance of Turkey to the EU and its accession process. Basically energy 
security issue deepens cooperation between Turkey and the EU. Energy cooperation 
between these two provides mutual benefits for both sides. It is expected that 
coordinated operation in energy security pushes Turkey to take active role in all EU 
actions regarding energy security. Collective policies for the proposed pipeline 
projects or the existing pipelines regarding integration to the European infrastructure 
and standards and implementation of the acquis are important during the accession 
process. On the other hand it should be borne in mind that Turkey is not the only 
country which would supply the overall energy demand of the Union. Although 
Turkey’s geopolitical location stresses Turkey’s importance regarding energy issues 
for the EU which is poor of major energy resources; the advantage of the location is 
not enough to draw a positive scene for future of Turkey’s relations with the EU. 
Thus cooperation in the energy field is not sufficient to pave Turkey’s way towards 
accession. In addition to these, uncertainty and ambivalence in decision of the EU 
regarding Turkish accession might push Turkey to choose decreasing the level of 
cooperation and switch its foreign policy toward other alternatives which might favor 
its energy card. In this sense Russia might become one of the alternatives. In addition 
to this, excluding Turkey may also cause interruptions between the Muslim world 
and the EU, and prevent aims of the EU to increase its influence in the Middle East.
As for the Turkish – Russian energy relations, this study reaches a conclusion 
regarding interdependence between these two countries. In these relations states are 
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not the only units pursuing energy policies; yet there are other various channels 
deepening cooperation for common interests in energy affairs by using market 
widening in energy sector as the basic tool. The focus of each country on absolute 
gains and increasing their shares in energy sectors ignoring the relativity of the gains 
compose the backbone of these relations, and Nabucco and South Stream Pipeline 
projects are conspicuous examples. Collective policies and benefits are backed by 
joint actions and commitment as observed in signed protocols and agreements. These 
positive aspects yielded these two countries to cooperate instead of pursuing rivalry 
between themselves  and have closer ties than they used to have since the collapse of 
the USSR. “There is an influential school of thought arguing that it is the economic 
cooperation – above all, the massive trade ties, lucrative energy relations – that is the 
primary vehicle that has been bringing Moscow and Ankara closer together since the 
end of the 1990s” (Tobakov, 2007: 5). This enables both countries to benefit of 
advantages of a win – win strategy. On the other hand, in addition to the assessment 
regarding increased cooperation, the other assessment would be dependence of 
Turkey on Russia. The improving country share in Turkish imports and growing rate 
of energy imports from Russia are remarkable. Trading gap (mainly because of trade 
of energy sources) favoring Russia and Turkey’s dependence on Russian sources, 
besides Russia’s passion to be involved in every pipeline project and Turkey’s aim 
for diversification, causes unilateral dependency which, actually, does not favor 
interdependence. However in any case, there has been increased cooperation 
favoring mutual interests and gains.
As concluding remarks, it should be noted that the aim of this thesis has not 
been to compare each case with each other and conclude that one is more dominant 
than the other in Turkish policies. Instead, this thesis has tried to analyze each case 
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separately and reach a conclusion in the light of applicable theories. As a result, it 
has reached to a general conclusion that the three countries have distinct importance. 
Effects of these cases on Turkish energy policies and Turkish foreign policies are 
varied, and it is hard to conclude that energy relations of Turkey with one country 
fundamentally come to the fore.
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